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We describe a stochastic network interdiction problem in which an in-
terdictor, subject to limited resources, installs radiation detectors at border
checkpoints in a transportation network in order to minimize the probability
that a smuggler of nuclear material can traverse the residual network unde-
tected. The problems are stochastic because the smuggler’s origin-destination
pair, the mass and type of material being smuggled, and the level of shielding
are known only through a probability distribution when the detectors are in-
stalled. We consider three variants of the problem. The first is a Stackelberg
game which assumes that the smuggler chooses a maximum-reliability path
through the network with full knowledge of detector locations. The second is
a Cournot game in which the interdictor and the smuggler act simultaneously.
The third is a “hybrid” game in which only a subset of detector locations is
revealed to the smuggler.
vii
In the Stackelberg setting, the problem is NP-complete even if the in-
terdictor can only install detectors at border checkpoints of a single country.
However, we can compute wait-and-see bounds in polynomial time if the in-
terdictor can only install detectors at border checkpoints of the origin and des-
tination countries. We describe mixed-integer programming formulations and
customized branch-and-bound algorithms which exploit this fact, and provide
computational results which show that these specialized approaches are sub-
stantially faster than more straightforward integer-programming implementa-
tions. We also present some special properties of the single-country case and
a complexity landscape for this family of problems.
The Cournot variant of the problem is potentially challenging as the
interdictor must place a probability distribution over an exponentially-sized
set of feasible detector deployments. We use the equivalence of optimization
and separation to show that the problem is polynomially solvable in the single-
country case if the detectors have unit installation costs. We present a row-
generation algorithm and a version of the weighted majority algorithm to solve
such instances. We use an exact-penalty result to formulate a model in which
some detectors are visible to the smuggler and others are not. This may be
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In this dissertation, we describe several models for deploying radiation
detectors in order to minimize the probability that a smuggler of nuclear ma-
terial can avoid detection. In a standard mathematical programming model,
a decision maker chooses values for a set of variables known as decision vari-
ables in order to minimize or maximize some function known as an objective
function or simply the objective. Many such models are well studied and are
appropriate if the objective depends only on decision variables controlled by
the decision maker. For our models, it is prudent to assume that the smuggler
is a strategic thinker and makes decisions in order to maximize the probability
that he can avoid detection. We therefore need to borrow heavily from game
theory, which was developed to model situations in which multiple parties with
differing and possibly conflicting objectives can affect each other’s objectives.
In a game, each party or player has a set of “strategies” from which to choose
and an objective function which typically depends on the strategies chosen by
the other players. A strategy can be defined as “a rule for action so complete
and detailed that a player need not actually be present once his strategy is
known” [38]. A game can be either zero-sum or general-sum; in the former
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case the sum of all the players’ gains is a constant and in the latter the sum
depends on which strategies the players select. Players may choose, and reveal,
their strategies either simultaneously or sequentially; we refer to the former
case as a “Cournot” game and the latter as a “Stackelberg” game.
Most credit game theory’s inception to von Neumann and Morgenstern
[37] who show that in any two-person zero-sum game, there exists an equi-
librium in which neither player has an incentive to change his own strategy
unilaterally. That is, neither player wishes to change his strategy even if he
is aware of the other player’s strategy. In many cases this equilibrium is only
guaranteed to exist if we allow the players to randomize their strategies. That
is, instead of choosing a single “pure” strategy, a player may choose a “mixed”
strategy which assigns a probability to each pure strategy. In a game such as
Rock, Paper, Scissors, for example, it is clear that no pure-strategy equilib-
rium exists but if we allow randomization then there exists a mixed-strategy
equilibrium in which each player uniformly and randomly selects one of the
three available strategies. Nash [28] shows that such an equilibrium exists even
in general-sum games and thus permanently attached his name to the concept.
Zero-sum games became a natural model for many military applications
as it is generally wise to assume your enemy is a strategic thinker. One of the
earliest and most well known of such models is the Colonel Blotto game [6, 35]
in which two players allocate soldiers to N independent battlefields. On each
battlefield the player who allocates the most soldiers wins and the player who
wins the most battlefields wins the overall game. The classic Blotto game
2
has become the baseline model for much of the recent research regarding the
allocation of resources to defend against terrorist threats, although many of
the latest models are not zero-sum.
Bier et al. [5] consider a model in which a defender allocates resources
to two sites and an attacker can choose to attack exactly one of the sites.
While the attacker is assumed to know the defender’s valuations of the sites,
the defender only has a distribution function for the attacker’s valuations. The
defender seeks to minimize the expected loss due to an attack plus cost of de-
fenses and the attacker seeks to maximize the expected payoff of the attack.
They prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for both play-
ers. Zhuang and Bier [44] describe a model for allocating resources to defend
against the dual threats of terrorism and natural disasters. In the model, a
defender can continuously allocate resources to defend against both threats
at multiple sites while an attacker continuously allocates resources to attack
those sites. Both simultaneous and sequential games are studied and, perhaps
surprisingly, the authors show that the defender may actually do better by re-
vealing his strategy to the attacker if the attacker’s optimal response is unique.
This so-called “first-mover advantage” is only possible, however, in a general-
sum setting. They also remark that pure strategy equilibria are common in
their game because continuous decision variables are used and the probability
of a successful attack is assumed to be convex in the defender’s allocations and
concave in the attacker’s.
Powell [30] describes a similar model where the defender again allocates
3
continuous resources to several potential targets. These defensive resources de-
crease the probability of a successful attack. The defender and the attacker
place possibly different values on each target, and the attacker chooses the tar-
get with the highest expected payoff, defined as the product of the probability
of success and the attacker’s value of the target. In the zero-sum setting in
which the attacker and defender have the same valuations of the targets, he
shows that the simultaneous and sequential game both have the same payoff.
He also shows that the defender’s optimal strategy is to allocate resources to
the target with the highest value until the expected payoff equals that of the
target with the second highest value. Then resources are allocated to both
targets until their expected payoff equals that of the third highest value and
so on, until the defender exhausts his resources. He also claims that this strat-
egy is optimal even if the attacker and defender have different valuations of
the targets.
Though intuitively it seems that a defender benefits by keeping his allo-
cations a secret, in the papers discussed previously, secrecy is either irrelevant
or may even hurt the defender. This may be the case in a general-sum game
but is never the case in a zero-sum game. Consider the following representation






Here the player who chooses x must choose first and reveal this decision to the
other player, who then chooses y. The game is zero-sum because one player
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seeks to maximize f(x, y) and the other seeks to maximize −f(x, y). We can













Then v∗1 ≥ v∗2.
Proof. Let x∗1 and y
∗










1) ≥ f(x∗1, y∗2) ≥ f(x∗2, y∗2) = v∗2.
So in a zero-sum game, the second-mover may have an advantage. So-called
minimax theorems identify conditions under which v∗1 = v
∗
2. One of the most
famous such theorems is the following, due to Fan [11].
Proposition 2. If X and Y are compact, convex sets and if f(·, y) is convex
on X for all y ∈ Y and f(x, ·) is concave on Y for all x ∈ X then v∗1 = v∗2.
If the conditions of Proposition 2 hold then neither player can benefit
from secrecy and thus the payoff of the game is the same whether the game is
sequential or simultaneous. For the games considered in [44], these conditions
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are satisfied due to continuous decision variables and the assumption of dimin-
ishing returns. In our work, some decisions are naturally discrete and we can
only achieve convexity of the feasible regions by allowing mixed strategies.
1.2 Two-Person Zero-Sum Cournot Games
In a two-person zero-sum Cournot game (TPZSCG), each player has a
set of “pure” strategies from which to choose, and strategies are assumed to
be selected simultaneously by the two players. The assumption that players
act simultaneously is valid provided neither player can ascertain the other
player’s selection. In the zero-sum case, which we focus on here, there exists an
objective function, sometimes called a payoff function, which depends on both
players’ selections and which one player seeks to maximize and the other seeks
to minimize [38]. In the so-called normal form representation of a TPZSCG we
use a payoff matrix to store all possible payoffs of the game [37]. This matrix
contains a row for each pure strategy available to the minimizing player, who
we call the “row player”, and a column for each pure strategy available to
the maximizing player, who we call the “column player.” When playing pure
strategies the row player picks a row, the column player simultaneously picks
a column, and the entry of the matrix that is at the intersection of the row
and column picks, becomes the payoff for the game. The normal form is valid
whenever both players have a finite number of pure strategies.
To address the simultaneous nature of the players’ decisions, instead
of selecting a single pure strategy, each player is motivated to select a mixed
6
strategy, a probability distribution over the available pure strategies. Then,
when the game is played each player randomly selects a pure strategy according
to the chosen probability distribution.
To formulate the normal form TPZSCG as a mathematical program,
let i ∈ I index the row players pure strategies and j ∈ J index those of the
column player. Then the row player’s decision variables, xi, i ∈ I, represent
the probability that pure strategy i is selected and the column player’s decision
variables, yj, j ∈ J , represent the probability that pure strategy j is selected.











where Y = {y ∈ R|J |+ :
∑




i∈I xi = 1}. The
objective function is simply the expected payoff conditioned on each player’s
mixed strategy. The ordering of the “max” and “min” seems to imply that the
column player selects his mixed strategy first and reveals his selection to the
row player. However, the fact that X and Y are convex and compact, coupled
with the fact that the objective function in (1.1) is concave in y for fixed x
and convex in x for fixed y, implies that, by Proposition 2, we obtain the same
optimal value, v∗, if we exchange the order of the “max” and “min”, i.e., if
the row player selects his mixed strategy first and reveals his selection to the
column player. Due to this symmetry, we can view the formulation as requiring
that the two players choose their mixed strategies simultaneously. This also
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implies that the optimal solution of this problem gives a Nash equilibrium,
that is, even if one player knows the other’s mixed strategy, that player still
has no incentive to deviate from his original mixed strategy. If in model (1.1),
we (a) fix y ∈ Y to create a linear program (LP) with variables x, (b) define
λ as the dual variable for the single structural constraint in that LP, (c) take








Aijyj : xi, i ∈ I (1.2b)∑
j∈J
yj = 1 (1.2c)
yj ≥ 0, j ∈ J. (1.2d)
Here, the column player takes a convex combination of the columns of A,
and the new decision variable λ is the smallest entry in the resulting column
vector. Thus λ represents the value of the row player’s best response to the
column player’s mixed strategy. From the column player’s perspective this
is a (seemingly) pessimistic view since it assumes the row player knows his
mixed strategy and acts accordingly. Equivalently, however, we can return to
model (1.1) and do the following: (a) interchange the “max” and “min”, (b)
fix x ∈ X to create an LP with variables y, (c) define θ as the dual variable
for the single structural constraint in that LP, (d) take the dual of the LP, and
8







Aijxi : yj, j ∈ J (1.3b)∑
i∈I
xi = 1 (1.3c)
xi ≥ 0, i ∈ I. (1.3d)
Here, the row player takes a convex combination of the rows of A and θ falls
onto the largest value of the resulting row vector. This would seem pessimistic
from the point of view of the row player. But problems (1.2) and (1.3) are
each other’s duals and therefore have the same optimal value according to
strong duality. This proves Proposition 2 for the special case in which the
payoff function is bilinear and the players’ feasible regions are unit simplices.
Also note that either LP gives an optimal mixed strategy for both players; the
primal solution gives probabilities for one player and the dual variables the
probabilities for the other.
1.3 The Weighted Majority Algorithm
For a two-person zero-sum Cournot game in which each player has
a modest number of strategies, the linear programs described in the previous
section provide an easy way to compute the Nash equilibrium. For the network
interdiction models considered in this dissertation, however, the interdictor
may have an exponentially-sized set of strategies. We could use standard row-
or column-generation techniques to overcome this difficulty, but instead turn
9
to a generalization of the “weighted majority” algorithm originally developed
by Littlestone and Warmuth [22] to solve on-line allocation models. Freund
and Schapire show that a slight modification of this algorithm can be used to
approximately solve games with a large or even unknown payoff matrix [12].
The on-line allocation model can be defined as follows. For every time
step t = 1, ..., T , an allocation agent must assign a probability pti to each
strategy i ∈ I. After each time period, the agent observes a loss lti ∈ [0, 1] for









The agent’s goal is to minimize the net loss, defined as the difference between
the expected cumulative loss and the minimum cumulative loss over all strate-








i. The weighted majority algorithm prescribes a choice
for pti, i ∈ I, t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, that we describe shortly. The net loss of the
weighted majority algorithm is bounded by O(
√
T log |I|) even if we allow the
loss vectors lt to be chosen in an adversarial fashion and to depend on the
agent’s choice of the distribution pt [13].
The algorithm is easy to implement. At each time period t, the agent
keeps a non-negative weight wti on each strategy and chooses a probability
10






, i ∈ I, t = 1, ..., T.
The agent, after observing the losses for each strategy, then updates the





where β ∈ (0, 1) is an appropriately chosen constant. The following result
from [13] relates the loss incurred by the weighted majority algorithm to the
loss of the best strategy.
Theorem 3. Let Lβ be the cumulative loss incurred by an agent applying the
weighted majority algorithm for a given value of β. For any sequence of loss
vectors l1, ..., lT and for any i ∈ I, we have
Lβ ≤
− ln(w1i )− Li ln β
1− β
.
In particular if we let i ∈ argmini∈ILi and choose w1i = 1/|I|, i ∈ I, we get
the following bound:
Lβ ≤
mini∈I Li ln(1/β) + ln |I|
1− β
.
To choose β, suppose that we have an upper bound L̃ on the loss incurred by
























Now consider a two-person zero-sum Cournot game with a payoff matrix
A and pure strategies for the row and column player indexed by i ∈ I and
j ∈ J , respectively. Every time period t, which we interpret as iterations in an
algorithmic solution procedure, the probabilities pti give a valid mixed-strategy
xti over the row player’s pure strategies i ∈ I. Suppose we choose the loss for






j)j∈J is the column player’s






















j, then x̄ and ȳ are valid mixed-
strategies for the row and column player, respectively. Following the analysis
of [12], we can show that x̄ and ȳ approximate the Nash equilibrium of the
































































Also, we show that mini∈I
Li
T
is exactly the column player’s payoff if he uses











































Using the fact that
Lβ
T













Aijxiȳj + ∆T . (1.6)
Inequality (1.6) implies that if the row player uses the mixed-strategy x̄, the
loss he incurs never exceeds the Nash equilibrium loss by more than ∆T . Like-
wise, subtracting ∆T from both sides of (1.6), we see that if the column player
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uses the mixed-strategy ȳ, the payoff he receives falls short of the Nash equi-
librium payoff by at most ∆T . It is in this sense that x̄ and ȳ approximate the
Nash equilibrium of the game.
1.4 Benders’ Decomposition




s.t. Ax = b (1.7b)
−Bx+Dy = d. (1.7c)
Assume that this LP has a finite optimal solution and that for every x that
satisfies Ax = b, x ≥ 0, there exists a y that satisfies Dy = Bx + d, y ≥ 0.









s.t. Dy = Bx+ d : π. (1.9b)
The dual feasible region of (1.9) is Π = {π : πD ≤ f} and the dual objective
is π(Bx + d). Therefore with π(1), ..., π(L) denoting the extreme points of Π,
14
h(x) = max1≤i≤L π
(i)(Bx + d). This implies that h(x) ≥ π(i)(Bx + d), i =




s.t. Ax = b (1.10b)
θ ≥ π(i)Bx+ d, i = 1, ..., L. (1.10c)
Constraints (1.10c) are called “optimality cuts.” Of course, enumerating all of
the extreme points of Π is grossly inefficient so we aim to solve relaxations of
the master problem (1.10) with optimality cuts generated for a small subset
of the extreme points of Π. We generate additional optimality cuts by solving
instances of the subproblem (1.9) with x fixed to an optimal solution of a
relaxation of (1.10). This identifies the most violated constraint in (1.10c)
which can then be added to the relaxation of the master problem. Since Π has
a finite number of extreme points this process is guaranteed to terminate in a
finite number of iterations. The above algorithm forms an outer-linearlization
of h(x). In stochastic programming this algorithm is known as the L-shaped
method [36]. In integer programming a similar method is due to Benders [4]
and in nonlinear programming a related method is due to Kelley [19].
1.5 Network Interdiction
Network interdiction deals with problems in which an interdictor, sub-
ject to one or more resource constraints, can structurally or parametrically
alter a given network. The interdictor does so knowing that an adversary
15
solves a network optimization problem in the resulting network, and the in-
terdictor’s goal is to optimally degrade the adversary’s performance. Many
models for network interdiction have been proposed, varying in the objectives
of the interdictor and adversary, the manner in which the interdictor may
change the network, and the underlying network optimization problem.
Wollmer considers problems in which the interdictor can remove a fixed
number of arcs from the network with the goal of either minimizing the maxi-
mum flow [41] or maximizing the minimum cost flow [42]. In Corley and Chang
[8], the interdictor removes a fixed number of nodes, and all arcs incident to
those nodes, in order to minimize the maximum flow. Fulkerson and Harding
[14] show that if the interdictor may continuously increase the lengths of the
arcs in a shortest path problem subject to a linear cost, then the problem is
equivalent to a minimum cost flow problem. Bayrak and Bailey [3] consider
a shortest path interdiction problem with asymmetric information in that the
adversary does not know the true lengths of the arcs. The authors formulate
the problem as a mixed-integer nonlinear program, which they then linearize.
Wood [43] proves that the problem of minimizing the maximum flow
subject to a cardinality constraint on the number of arcs that can be removed
is NP-complete in the strong sense. He also shows that the problem can be
formulated as a mixed-integer program by using the equivalence between the
max-flow and min-cut problems and suggests several valid inequalities that
can be used to strengthen the formulation. Lim and Smith [21] consider two
multicommodity versions of this problem; in the first arcs are completely de-
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stroyed when interdicted, and in the second arc capacities can be continuously
decreased. Smith et al. [33] considers the problem of designing a multicom-
modity flow network that is robust with respect to an intelligent attacker. The
authors propose a three-stage model; in the first stage the network designer
constructs a network, in the second stage an attacker reduces the capacity of
some arcs in the network, and in the third stage the designer solves a multi-
commodity flow problem on the residual network. The authors consider three
models of attacker behavior; in the first two the attacker destroys arcs in a
greedy fashion and in the third the attacker seeks to minimize the maximum
post-interdiction profit. Each case is formulated as a mixed-integer program,
and a cutting-plane algorithm is suggested for the third.
Israeli and Wood [18] develop a decomposition scheme for the problem
of maximizing the adversary’s shortest path when the interdictor can discretely
increase the length of some subset of arcs. Specifically, a master problem first
finds an interdiction plan that maximizes the minimum length of some sub-
set of the adversary’s feasible paths, then a subproblem generates the best
response path to this interdiction plan and adds it to the subset of paths
considered by the master. The optimal value of the master problem and the
length of the best response path provide upper and lower bounds, respectively,
to allow termination with an ε-optimal solution. The authors also introduce
the notion of a super-valid inequality, an inequality which is guaranteed not to
remove all optimal solutions to a problem unless the optimal solution has al-
ready been found. The idea behind these super-valid inequalities is as follows.
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The subproblem generates the adversary’s best response to a feasible interdic-
tion plan and consequently produces a lower bound to the master problem.
To achieve a maximum shortest path greater than this lower bound, the in-
terdictor must remove at least one arc on the shortest path generated by the
subproblem. Several variants of the super-valid inequality are discussed and
are shown to considerably speed solution time.
Washburn and Wood [39] consider a model in which the interdictor
chooses an arc k to interdict and the adversary simultaneously chooses a path
to traverse. If the adversary’s path includes the interdicted arc, then the adver-
sary is detected with probability pk, otherwise the adversary is not detected.
They show that optimal mixed strategies for both players can be found by
solving a minimum-cut problem. Interestingly, the optimal mixed strategy for
the interdictor is to interdict arcs along this minimum-cut with a probability
that is inversely proportional to the detection probability on that arc. Sev-
eral extensions to the basic model are considered. In particular, under certain
conditions the problem in which the interdictor can choose multiple arcs to
interdict can also be solved via a minimum-cut problem.
Morton et al. [26] look at stochastic network interdiction problems
with a focus on the prevention of nuclear smuggling. In the basic model,
every arc in a transportation network has an associated evasion probability,
and the interdictor may discretely decrease the evasion probability on some
subset of those arcs by installing detectors with the goal of minimizing the
evasion probability of the maximum-reliability path. The model is stochastic
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in that the interdictor does not know the adversary’s origin and destination
but instead has a probability distribution over a number of potential origin-
destination pairs. A simplified model is discussed in which the interdictor
may only install detectors at border checkpoints of a single country, and valid
inequalities known as step inequalities are developed to tighten the resulting
mixed-integer program. Morton and Pan [25] develop an enhanced L-shaped
decomposition method for solving the general model. Step inequalities are
also developed to tighten the linear programming relaxation of the associated
master problem.
1.6 Attacker-Defender Models and Exact Penalty Re-
sults
Here we describe a canonical problem which we use as the basis for
many of our models. Brown et al. [7] propose an “attacker-defender” model




s.t. Ay = b (1.11b)
Fy ≤ u. (1.11c)
Constraints (1.11b) include operation requirements of the defender’s system
and (1.11c) are capacity constraints for each of the defender’s assets that is
vulnerable to attack. An attacker, subject to his own resource constraints,
attacks some subset of these assets with the goal of maximizing the defender’s
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cost of operating the resulting system. Assuming an attack on an asset is
guaranteed to destroy the entire capacity of that asset, the attacker’s problem








s.t. Ay = b (1.13b)
Fy ≤ U(e− x) : −π(x). (1.13c)
Here U = diag(u), e is the vector of all 1s, and x ∈ X contains binary re-
strictions on x as well as the attacker’s resource constraints. If a component
of x takes value 1 then the corresponding capacity drops to 0, and otherwise
the capacity remains at its nominal value. Since X is not a convex set, the
order of the “max” and “min” cannot be interchanged. The defender then
operates the system with any assets which were not destroyed. A natural way
to reformulate (1.12) is to convert the inner linear program to a maximization
problem by taking its dual. Unfortunately this yields a term containing the
product of x and π and thus a nonlinear mixed-integer program.
The underlying problem here is that since x appears on the right-hand
side of the constraints, h(·) is a convex function over the convex hull of X.
But since we are maximizing over x, we would prefer h(·) to be concave. This
can be achieved if we can relax constraints (1.13c) and add an appropriate
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penalty term to the objective. The following refinement of an exact-penalty





s.t. Ay = b : γ (1.15)
Fy ≤ u : −π, (1.16)




cy + π̄(Fy − u)+ (1.17)
s.t. Ay = b, (1.18)
where x+ = max(x, 0), then v∗ = v∗∗.




s.t. Ay = b : γ
Fy − θ ≤ u : −π.




s.t. γA− πF ≤ c : y (1.19b)
π ≤ π̄ : θ (1.19c)
π ≥ 0. (1.19d)
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This is exactly the dual of (1.15) with the addition of constraint (1.19c). How-
ever, by assumption π̄ ≥ π∗ for some optimal π∗, so the addition of (1.19c)
does not remove all optimal solutions to the dual of (1.15). Therefore by strong
duality v∗ = v∗∗.
Applying Proposition 4 to (1.13) results in a penalty term of the form
π̄(Fy − U(e − x))+. A standard linearization of this term moves x back into
the constraints. But the fact that the components of x are binary coupled
with Fy being nominally bounded above by u allows us to keep x in the
objective and out of the constraints. To see why, we write the kth component
of (Fy − U(e − x))+ as (Fk·y − uk(1 − xk))+, which equals 0 if xk = 0 and
equals Fk·y if xk = 1. Thus, we have π̄(Fy − U(e − x))+ = xT Π̄Fy for all
x ∈ X where Π̄ = diag(π̄).
We now define a new function h̄(x) as follows:
h̄(x) = min
y≥0
cy + xT Π̄Fy (1.20a)
s.t. Ay = b (1.20b)
Fy ≤ u, (1.20c)
where π̄ ≥ π∗(x) for all x ∈ X and π∗(x) is an optimal dual subvector to
(1.13). By Proposition 4, h(x) = h̄(x) for all x ∈ X, but h̄(·) is concave over
the convex hull of X, making it more amenable to maximization. In particular
we can either take the dual of (1.20) to obtain a mixed-integer linear program,
or apply a decomposition scheme such as Benders’ decomposition.
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1.7 Overview of the Contents
Pan [29] considers a stochastic network interdiction problem in which
the interdictor seeks to minimize the maximum-reliability path in a network.
The interdictor, subject to a budget constraint, installs radiation detectors on
some subset of arcs in the network. A detector has the effect of decreasing
the reliability of the arc at which it is installed. The adversary is a smuggler
of nuclear material whose characteristics, such as his origin and destination,
the mass and type of material being smuggled, and the thickness of the lead
shielding, are known only via a probability distribution at the time the in-
terdictor installs the detectors. This dissertation augments and extends that
work as follows.
In Chapter 2, we consider a special case in which the interdictor can
only install detectors at border checkpoints of a single country. We assume
that the smuggler chooses a path with knowledge of the detector locations
and arc reliabilities. While [29] shows that the problem is NP-complete sub-
ject to a cardinality or knapsack constraint on the number of detectors that
are installed, we describe a formulation of this problem which has a totally
unimodular constraint matrix when the budget constraint is relaxed. As a
result, the budget-constrained version of the problem can be solved in poly-
nomial time under certain conditions. We show that the solutions that can be
found in polynomial time are nested, that is, for any pair of such solutions, the
checkpoints which receive detectors in the solution with the smaller budget
will be a subset of those which receive detectors in the other. We also describe
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a customized branch-and-bound algorithm which performs well in practice.
Chapter 3 considers a variant of the single-country problem in which
the interdictor and the smuggler act simultaneously. The resulting model
is a two-person zero-sum Cournot game in which the interdictor can have
exponentially-many strategies. We discuss the complexity of the model and
describe a solution technique based on the weighted majority algorithm. In
the cardinality-constrained case, we show that the value of the game can be
found by solving a polynomially-sized linear program. We also suggest two
Cournot-Stackelberg “hybrid” models in which one player may either pur-
chase additional pure strategies for his own use or remove pure strategies from
his opponent’s strategy set. The latter model is used as the basis for an in-
terdiction model in which some detectors are transparent to the smuggler and
others are not.
Chapter 4 considers a network interdiction problem in which the inter-
dictor may install detectors along border checkpoints of two countries, typically
the origin and destination countries of a smuggler. We show that this problem
can be solved in polynomial time if the smuggler characteristics are known
before detectors are installed. We also show that in the stochastic setting,
many of the solution techniques described in Chapter 2 for the single-country
problem have natural extensions into the two-country version and are very
effective at reducing computational effort. We conclude with some complex-
ity results which show that some polynomially-solvable interdiction problems
become NP-complete when we add an additional country to the problem.
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Chapter 2
Bipartite Stochastic Network Interdiction
Problem
2.1 Introduction
We describe a stochastic network interdiction model designed to locate ra-
diation detectors, which detect gamma and neutron emissions from nuclear
material, at critical border crossings. The goal is to locate the detectors on
an underlying transportation network to minimize the probability of a suc-
cessful smuggling attempt. We focus on the development of a strengthened
mixed-integer programming formulation and a customized branch-and-bound
algorithm which reduce the required computational effort.
We model two adversaries, an interdictor and a smuggler, and a trans-
portation network G(N,A). The smuggler starts at origin node o ∈ N and
wishes to reach destination node d ∈ N . The probability that the smuggler
will evade detection while traversing arc (i, j) ∈ A is qij if the interdictor in-
stalls a detector on (i, j) and pij > qij otherwise. At most one detector may
be installed per arc. A smuggler can be caught by indigenous law enforcement
without detection equipment, and so pij < 1. Detection events on distinct arcs
are assumed to be mutually independent. The smuggler chooses an o-d path to
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maximize his evasion probability. With limited resources, the interdictor must
select arcs on which to install detectors in order to minimize this probability.
The threat scenario, indexed by ω ∈ Ω, specifies the origin-destination
pair, (oω, dω), as well as other details about the nuclear material being smug-
gled and the manner in which it is shielded. So, the probability a smuggler
evades detection if a detector is installed on arc (i, j) is scenario dependent,
i.e., qij depends on ω, denoted q
ω
ij. In general, the indigenous evasion proba-
bilities, pij, could also depend on the threat scenario. The bulk of what we
present is valid when pij = p
ω
ij, but in Section 2.3 we discuss a computationally
valuable variable-aggregation scheme that arises naturally when pij does not
depend on ω. The threat scenario is unknown when detectors are installed,
but is governed by a probability mass function, pω, ω ∈ Ω, which is assumed
to be known. In what follows, “threat scenario ω” will often be shortened to
simply “smuggler ω.”
The timing of the interdictor’s and smuggler’s decisions and the realiza-
tion of the threat scenario is as follows: First, the interdictor installs detectors
on a subset of the network’s arcs subject to a budget constraint. Then, a






pωij(1− xij) + qωijxij
]
, (2.1)
where Poω ,dω is the set of all o
ω-dω paths and where xij = 1 if a detector is
installed on arc (i, j) and xij = 0 otherwise. We conservatively assume the
smuggler selects a path with full knowledge of the detector locations and eva-
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sion probabilities. For a given ω ∈ Ω and installation plan xij, (i, j) ∈ A, the
value of (2.1) gives the probability that the smuggler traverses the network
undetected, conditional on the realization of threat scenario ω. The inter-
dictor seeks to minimize the sum of these conditional evasion probabilities,
each weighted by pω, over all threat scenarios. Problem (2.1) is a maximum-
reliability path problem since both the evasion probabilities and the installa-
tion plan are fixed and known to the smuggler by the time he selects a path.
Then we can view the interdictor’s problem as minimizing the expected value
of the maximum-reliability path.
Morton et al. [26] formulate the problem on a general network as
a mixed-integer program and Pan and Morton [25] develop an enhanced L-
shaped decomposition method and use valid inequalities when solving the as-
sociated master problem. See [18] for the deterministic version of this problem,
[3] for a variant with asymmetric information, and [9] for a variant in which
interdiction successes are uncertain. We give a more extensive review of net-
work interdiction research in Section 1.5. This chapter develops mixed-integer
programming formulations and enhanced branch-and-bound algorithms for the
special case of this problem in which a smuggler encounters at most one de-
tector. These enhancements significantly reduce computational effort. Also,
while this special case is known to be NP-complete, we describe a condition
under which we can solve an instance in polynomial time.
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2.2 Problem Description
We restrict attention to a special case that arises when we can only
place detectors at border-crossing checkpoints of a single country. The key to
simplifying the formulation in this case is that each oω-dω path has exactly
one arc on which the smuggler could encounter a detector. Let K be the set
of checkpoint arcs, i.e., arcs that a smuggler could traverse depending on the
selected path, that could contain a detector. For each ω, we compute the value
of the maximum-reliability path from oω to the tail of each checkpoint arc and
the value of the maximum-reliability path from the head of each checkpoint
arc to dω. Call the product of these two probabilities γωk , k = (i, j) ∈ K.







k , depending on whether a detector is installed. Figure 2.1
shows the topology of the preprocessed network and the transformed bipartite
network. We can then formulate the bipartite stochastic network interdiction
problem (BiSNIP) as follows.
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Figure 2.1: (a) Network topology after preprocessing for the single country
problem. Only border crossing arcs can receive detectors, so the network be-
tween the source and the tails of the checkpoint arcs and the heads of the




K set of border checkpoints
Data:
b total budget for installing detectors
ck cost of installing a detector at border checkpoint k ∈ K
Random elements:
ω ∈ Ω sample point and sample space for threat scenarios
pω probability mass function




k probability smuggler ω can traverse checkpoint k undetected with
a detector installed
γωk product of the values of the maximum-reliability paths from o
ω to
the tail of arc k and from the head of arc k to dω for smuggler ω
Interdictor’s decision variables:
xk 1 if a detector is installed at checkpoint k and 0 otherwise
Smuggler’s decision variables:







s.t. x ∈ X (2.2b)
θω ≥ γωk pωk (1− xk), k ∈ K,ω ∈ Ω (2.2c)
θω ≥ γωk qωk xk, k ∈ K,ω ∈ Ω, (2.2d)
where X = {x ∈ B|K| :
∑
k∈K ckxk ≤ b}.
BiSNIP (2.2) may be viewed on a bipartite network with arcs (ω, k)
linking each threat scenario with its checkpoints. Variable θω is the conditional
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probability the smuggler avoids detection, given ω, and model (2.2) minimizes
the (unconditional) probability the smuggler avoids detection. Constraints
(2.2c) and (2.2d) force the evasion probability for each smuggler to equal that
of the maximum reliability path, i.e., θω = maxk∈K{γωk pωk (1− xk), γωk qωk xk}.
Our initial attempts to solve the BiSNIP model (2.2) using a branch-
and-bound solution method indicated that BiSNIP’s linear-programming (LP)
relaxation can produce very weak lower bounds. The following proposition
tightens constraints (2.2c) and effectively eliminates constraints (2.2d) in the
BiSNIP model.
Proposition 5. Consider the BiSNIP model (2.2), let qωmax ≡ maxk∈K γωk qωk ,
and assume 0 ≤ qωk ≤ pωk ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γωk ≤ 1 for all k ∈ K, ω ∈ Ω. Then the
inequalities
θω ≥ γωk pωk − (γωk pωk − qωmax)xk, k ∈ K, ω ∈ Ω (2.3a)
θω ≥ qωmax, ω ∈ Ω (2.3b)
are valid for BiSNIP.
Proof. Let k∗ ∈ argmaxk∈Kγωk qωk for some ω ∈ Ω. If xk∗ = 1, then constraint
(2.2d) dominates (2.2c) and yields θω ≥ γωk∗qωk∗ = qωmax. And, if xk∗ = 0 then
constraint (2.2c) dominates (2.2d) and yields θω ≥ γωk∗pωk∗ ≥ γωk∗qωk∗ = qωmax.
This proves the validity of (2.3b). Now for any k ∈ K, if xk = 1 then (2.3a)
becomes (2.3b), and if xk = 0 then (2.3a) is equivalent to (2.2c). Thus (2.3a)
is valid as well.
31
We can view the right-hand side of (2.3b) as providing an optimistic bound,
from the interdictor’s perspective, on the evasion probability of smuggler ω.
Then (2.3a) is simply a strengthened version of (2.2c) in which the right-hand
side drops down to the lower bound qωmax instead of zero when xk = 1.
We can replace constraints (2.2c) and (2.2d) in BiSNIP with (2.3a) and
(2.3b) since every constraint in the former set is dominated by some constraint
in the latter. In doing so we obtain a model with half as many structural
constraints and at least as strong an LP relaxation. Furthermore, defining
θ̄ω = θω − qωmax and rωk = (γωk pωk − qωmax)+, where (·)+ = max(·, 0), we can






s.t. x ∈ X (2.4b)
θ̄ω ≥ rωk (1− xk), k ∈ K, ω ∈ Ω. (2.4c)
Here γωk p
ω
k ≤ qωmax implies that rωk = 0 and in this case, the corre-
sponding constraint (2.4c) reduces to a non-negativity constraint. This occurs
when smuggler ω prefers a checkpoint with evasion probability qωmax to that of
checkpoint k. Model (2.4) implicitly ignores such checkpoint-smuggler pairs.
Model (2.4) is equivalent to BiSNIP in that both models have the same
set of optimal solutions for locating the detectors, but their objective functions
differ by the constant
∑
ω∈Ω p
ωqωmax. We can view this as a transformation to a
model in which the radiation detectors are perfectly reliable, i.e., model (2.4)
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has the form of model (2.2) with qωk = 0. We conclude by noting that in some
instances (2.4) can be further tightened by replacing (2.4c) with






rωk (1− xk), ω ∈ Ω. (2.6)
We can efficiently compute θω for each ω ∈ Ω by sorting the checkpoints in
decreasing order by rωk , then greedily allocating detectors until the interdiction
budget b is depleted. This is equivalent to solving the wait-and-see problem,
that is, each θω is computed under the assumption that we know in advance
that threat scenario ω is realized and allocate the detectors accordingly.
2.3 Scenario Aggregation
We now focus our discussion on the transformed model (2.4) but sup-
press the “bar” notation on θω for simplicity. Suppose that for some pair of
smugglers ω, ω′ ∈ Ω we can index the checkpoints in K, k1, k2, . . . , k|K|, such
that rωk1 ≥ r
ω
k2
≥ · · · ≥ rωk|K| and r
ω′
k1
≥ rω′k2 ≥ · · · ≥ r
ω′
k|K|
. That is to say, both
of these particular smugglers may have different evasion probabilities at some
or all checkpoints, but they can rank-order the checkpoints in an identical
manner.
The motivation for considering the above situation in the context of the
BiSNIP model arises as follows. Suppose the indigenous evasion probabilities
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do not depend on the threat scenario. Consider two smugglers, ω and ω′, that
are identical in every way, including their origin-destination pair, the mass and
type of material they smuggle, etc., except that smuggler ω shields his material
better than does smuggler ω′. Then, for each checkpoint the indigenous eva-
sion probabilities associated with traveling from origin to destination via that






k for all k ∈ K.
And, the evasion probability at each checkpoint will be larger for the smuggler
with better shielding, qωk > q
ω′
k for all k ∈ K. This then results in smugglers ω
and ω′ ordering their checkpoints in an identical manner. As suggested above,
there may be fewer positive values of rωk , k ∈ K, than of rω
′
k , k ∈ K, but they
will still satisfy the requisite (inclusive) ordering condition. The same result
can arise, for example, when the two smugglers are carrying different masses of
nuclear material, and it can arise for distinct origin-destination pairs, typically
in close geographic proximity. It can also arise when the indigenous evasion
probabilities depend on the threat scenario, as long as their ordering is identi-




k − qωmax)+, two smugglers with different but
identically ordered γωk p
ω
k values satisfy the ordering condition.
Fix an interdiction plan for BiSNIP, x = (xk)k∈K ∈ X. Then for ω and




where k∗ ∈ argmaxk∈Krωk (1−xk) and k∗ ∈ argmaxk∈Krω
′
k (1−xk) can be taken
to be the same checkpoint. The contribution of θω and θω
′
to the objective




. Of course, we do not know x ahead of
time but we can replace ω and ω′ with a single scenario, say ω̄. The objective
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function coefficient of θω̄ is equal to pω + pω
′
, and the evasion probability at






for scenario ω̄. Extending these ideas to an arbitrary number of scenarios
yields the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Consider model (2.4), let x ∈ X, and let θω = maxk∈K rωk (1−
xk). Suppose there exists a partition, Ω
n, n ∈ N, of Ω such that every smuggler
in a particular subset Ωn orders his evasion probabilities in an identical fashion.




· · · ≥ rωkn|K| for all ω ∈ Ω
n. Let θωn = maxk∈K r
ωn





ωn and where pωn =
∑
ω∈Ωn p




Proof. Under the ordering assumption for rωk , ω ∈ Ω, for each x ∈ X and
n ∈ N, there exists a k∗ such that rωk∗ = maxk∈K rωk (1 − xk), ∀ω ∈ Ωn. Since
pω ≥ 0,∀ω, k∗ also maximizes
∑
ω∈Ωn p




















Corollary 7. Under the hypotheses of Proposition 6, the following model is






s.t. x ∈ X (2.7)
θωn ≥ rωnk (1− xk), k ∈ K, n ∈ N.
In the equivalent aggregated model (2.7), rωnk and θ
ωn are still conditional
evasion probabilities but are now conditioned on the event ω ∈ Ωn whereas
their counterparts in (2.4) were conditioned on the realization of a single threat
scenario. Similarly pωn = P (Ωn) is the probability that a threat scenario in
Ωn is realized.
2.4 Step Inequalities
Previous work (e.g., [26, 29]) tightening the LP relaxation of (2.4) in-
volves the development of a class of valid inequalities known as step inequali-
ties. To motivate these step inequalities, we first define some notation which
we will use for the remainder of this chapter. Let k(i, ω) ∈ K be an index
mapping of the checkpoints such that rωk(i,ω) ≥ rωk(i+1,ω) for all i = 1, . . . , |K|−1
and ω ∈ Ω and that ∪|K|i=1{k(i, ω)} = K for all ω ∈ Ω. Then we define a set
Kωk for every k ∈ K and ω ∈ Ω which satisfies
Kωk(i,ω) = {k(i′, ω) : 1 ≤ i′ < i}, 1 ≤ i ≤ |K|, ω ∈ Ω. (2.8)
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We can view Kωk as the set of all checkpoints which smuggler ω ranks higher
than checkpoint k, with ties between checkpoints being resolved arbitrarily.
So every k′ ∈ Kωk satisfies rωk′ ≥ rωk and every k′ /∈ Kωk satisfies rωk′ ≤ rωk . Now
let T (ω) = {k1, . . . , kl} ⊆ K satisfy ki ∈ Kωki+1 for i = 1, . . . , l − 1. Then we
must have rωk1 ≥ r
ω
k2
≥ · · · ≥ rωkl and can define a step inequality on T (ω) as
follows:
θω ≥ rωk1 − (r
ω
k1
− rωk2)xk1 − · · · − (r
ω
kl
− rωkl+1)xkl , (2.9)
where rωkl+1 ≡ 0. The number of step inequalities for every scenario can be
exponential in |K| and so adding all possible step inequalities to (2.4) is out
of the question. Instead, we iteratively solve the linear-programming relax-
ation of (2.4) and add step inequalities on an as-needed basis. The separation
problem for step inequalities requires that given (x̂, θ̂), a feasible solution to
the LP relaxation of (2.4), we either identify a most violated step inequality
for each ω or determine that none are violated. To find a most violated step
inequality for some ω, if it exists, we must find a T (ω) which maximizes the






− rωk2)x̂k1 − · · · − (r
ω
kl
− rωkl+1)x̂kl , (2.10)
for each ω ∈ Ω. The following results show that we can determine whether a
particular k should be included in an optimal solution to (2.10) by sorting. For
this result and for the remainder of the chapter we reserve the “hat” notation,
as in (x̂, θ̂), for solutions of the LP relaxation.
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Proposition 8. Let ω ∈ Ω and x̂ ∈ [0, 1]|K| be given. There exists an optimal




Proof. We first show that we can construct an optimal solution to (2.10) which
contains every k which satisfies either Kωk = ∅ or (2.11). We then show that
any checkpoint k which satisfies neither Kωk = ∅ nor (2.11) can be removed
from this optimal solution without decreasing the objective.
Suppose that T ∗(ω) is an optimal solution to (2.10) and zω is the corre-
sponding optimal value. We first consider the case in which Kωk = ∅ for some
k ∈ K \ T ∗(ω),








≤ rωk − (rωk − rωk1)x̂k − · · · − (r
ω
kl
− rωkl+1)x̂kl . (2.12)
The inequality in (2.12) holds since x̂k ≤ 1 and since Kωk = ∅ implies rωk ≥
rωk1 . But since (2.12) is simply the objective function of (2.10) evaluated at
T (ω) = T ∗(ω) ∪ {k}, adding k to an optimal solution of (2.10) will maintain
optimality. We turn to the case in which there exists k ∈ K \ T ∗(ω) such
that Kωk 6= ∅ and x̂k < mink′∈Kωk x̂k′ . If T
∗(ω) ∩ Kωk = ∅, then adding k to
T ∗(ω) cannot decrease the objective function as shown above. So we assume
T ∗(ω)∩Kωk 6= ∅ and let i′ = max{i:ki∈T ∗(ω)∩Kωk } i. Then ki′ ∈ K
ω
k and for i
′ 6= l,
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ki′+1 /∈ Kωk . We can then add k to the right-hand side of the step inequality
between ki′ and ki′+1 as follows:
zω = rωk1 − · · · − (r
ω
ki′
− rωki′+1)x̂ki′ − · · ·
= rωk1 − · · · − (r
ω
ki′
− rωk )x̂ki′ − (r
ω
k − rωki′+1)x̂ki′ − · · ·
≤ rωk1 − · · · − (r
ω
ki′
− rωk )x̂ki′ − (r
ω
k − rωki′+1)x̂k − · · ·. (2.13)
The inequality in (2.13) holds since ki′ ∈ Kωk implies x̂k < x̂ki′ and ki′+1 /∈ K
ω
k
implies rωk ≥ rωki′+1 . Note that the above still holds if i
′ = l since we defined
rωkl+1 to be 0 and rk ≥ 0. But (2.13) is simply the objective function of (2.10)
evaluated at T (ω) = T ∗(ω) ∪ {k}. So, starting with an arbitrary optimal
solution to (2.10), we can add any checkpoint satisfying either Kωk = ∅ or
(2.11) and maintain optimality. This proves the reverse direction.
Now suppose T ∗(ω) contains all k satisfying either Kωk = ∅ or (2.11)
but also contains some k with Kωk 6= ∅ which does not satisfy (2.11). It must
hold that at least one element of argmink′∈Kωk x̂k
′ is in T ∗(ω). Then there exists
ki, ki+1 ∈ T ∗(ω) such that x̂ki ≤ x̂ki+1 , and so,
zω = rωk1 − · · · − (r
ω
ki
− rωki+1)x̂ki − (r
ω
ki+1
− rωki+2)x̂ki+1 − · · ·
≤ rωk1 − · · · − (r
ω
ki
− rωki+1)x̂ki − (r
ω
ki+1
− rωki+2)x̂ki − · · ·
= rωk1 − · · · − (r
ω
ki+2
− rωki)x̂ki − · · ·. (2.14)
But (2.14) is simply the objective function of (2.10) evaluated at T (ω) =
T ∗(ω)\ki+1. So we can remove ki+1 without decreasing the objective function.
But ki+1 satisfies neither K
ω
ki+1
= ∅ nor (2.11) since ki ∈ Kωki+1 . If we iteratively
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remove all such checkpoints, after a finite number of iterations we obtain an
optimal solution which only includes checkpoints satisfying either Kωk = ∅ or
(2.11).
Proposition 8 provides an algorithm for generating an optimal solution to
(2.10) in polynomial time. In fact, we can sort rωk , k ∈ K, for each ω ∈
Ω, prior to beginning the iterative separation process, then we can solve the
separation problem for some ω ∈ Ω by making at most |K| comparisons.
Defining mink′∈∅ x̂k′ to be 1, we can also obtain an analytical form for z
ω in
terms of x̂ as follows.
Proposition 9. Let ω ∈ Ω and x̂ ∈ [0, 1]|K| be given. Then the optimal value
















rωki(x̂ki−1 − x̂ki), (2.16)
where x̂k0 ≡ 1. By Proposition 8 we have that we can form an optimal
solution T ∗(ω) to (2.10) via the rule k ∈ T ∗(ω) if and only if either Kωk = ∅ or
x̂k < mink′∈Kωk x̂k′ . For such an optimal set, T




Equation (2.17) holds for i = 1 since x̂k0 = 1 and K
ω
k1
= ∅. Suppose that
(2.17) does not hold for some i > 1. Then there exists a non-empty set
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K ′ = {k′ ∈ Kωki : x̂k′ < x̂ki−1}. If any element of K
′ also lies in Kωki−1 , then
ki−1 would not satisfy condition (2.11) and thus would not be included in
T ∗(ω). If none of the elements of K ′ lie in Kωki−1 , then at least one element of
K ′ would have been included in T ∗(ω) between ki−1 and ki. In either case we
























for all ω ∈ Ω. The equality in (2.18) is due to the fact that x̂k ≥ mink′∈Kωk x̂k′
for any k ∈ K \ T ∗(ω).
Corollary 10. Consider the LP relaxation of model (2.4) in which all of the
step inequalities have been added. If (x̂, θ̂) denotes an optimal solution to this















Note that we can say that θ̂ω = zω even if none of the step inequalities are
violated for a particular ω since the original inequalities (2.4c) are special cases
of the step inequality. That is, if no step inequalities are violated for some




We now describe a polynomially-sized reformulation of BiSNIP, whose
LP relaxation is as strong as that of (2.4) with every step inequality added. Our
motivation for developing this reformulation is three-fold. First, a compact
reformulation may be preferable in terms of ease of implementation. Second,
the reformulation reveals some interesting theoretical results which we present
in Section 2.6. Third, the reformulation is amenable to a customized branch-
and-bound scheme which we describe in Section 2.8.
Let decision variable vωk equal 1 if smuggler ω traverses checkpoint k
and 0 otherwise, and let vωk0 equal 1 if all checkpoints are interdicted and 0
otherwise, where k0 6∈ K is an additional dummy index. These variables allow












k , ω ∈ Ω (2.20c)
xk ≥ vωk0 +
∑
k′∈K\K̄ωk




vωk = 1, ω ∈ Ω (2.20e)
0 ≤ vωk ≤ 1, k ∈ K ∪ {k0}, ω ∈ Ω, (2.20f)
where K̄ωk = K
ω




k′ as 0. Constraint (2.20d) says
that a smuggler will only traverse a checkpoint ranked lower than checkpoint k
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if a detector is installed at checkpoint k. Constraint (2.20e) requires that each
smuggler traverses exactly one checkpoint and (2.20c) selects the appropriate
evasion probability for each smuggler. We do not enforce integrality constraints
on v since, as we show later, there is no incentive to fractionalize v when x is
binary.
To see that model (2.20) properly computes the conditional evasion
probabilities θω, ω ∈ Ω, let x ∈ X be a feasible installation plan and kω∗ ∈
argmax{k:xk=0}r
ω
k be an optimal response for smuggler ω given x. Since xkω∗ =
0, by (2.20d) vωk must be 0 for all k ranked lower than k
ω∗. The variable vωkω∗ ,
along with any vωk corresponding to a k ranked higher than k
ω∗, is not bound
by constraint (2.20d). For each ω ∈ Ω, in order to minimize θω and satisfy
constraint (2.20e), we choose from amongst the free vωk one of the variables
with the smallest rωk coefficient to be 1. So we can choose v
ω
kω∗ = 1 which
yields the appropriate evasion probability θω = rωkω∗ . For the trivial case in
which xk = 1, ∀k ∈ K, we can set vωk0 = 1 and achieve θ
ω = 0. In practice, the
budget is typically small enough so that it is impossible to install a detector
at every checkpoint and in that case we can fix vωk0 = 0.
We can informally comment on the strength of (2.20) as follows. Con-
sider the LP relaxation of (2.20), and suppose that xk = 0 for some k ∈ K.
Then vωk′ = 0 for all k
′ ∈ K such that rωk′ < rωk by (2.20d) and θω ≥ rωk , with
equality holding only if vωk = 1. But v
ω




k , again by (2.20d). Contrast this with the LP relaxation of (2.4), in









k . We next comment more formally on the strength of (2.20) by first
showing that the optimal value of its LP relaxation is equal to that of (2.4)
with all step inequalities added.
Lemma 11. There exists an optimal solution to the LP relaxation of (2.20)
(x̂, θ̂, v̂), in which
v̂ωk =




for all k ∈ K,ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. By constraint (2.20e), we can rewrite constraint (2.20d) as:
xk ≥ 1− vωk −
∑
k′∈Kωk
vωk′ , k ∈ K, ω ∈ Ω. (2.21)
Rearranging the terms of (2.21) and incorporating the non-negativity con-
straints on v we obtain:
vωk ≥
1− xk − ∑
k′∈Kωk
vωk′
+ ≡ vωk , k ∈ K, ω ∈ Ω. (2.22)
Let ω ∈ Ω and suppose (2.22) is strict for some k ∈ K at an optimal solution





let k2 ∈ argmin{k′:k1∈Kωk′}|K
ω
k′ | if Kωk1 ∪ {k1} 6= K and k2 = k0 otherwise. Now







+ ε, and θω = θ̂ω − ε(rωk1 − r
ω
k2
), where ε = v̂ωk1 − v
ω
k1
and rωk0 ≡ 0. To
show that this perturbed solution satisfies (2.20d), we equivalently show that
it satisfies (2.22). For k ∈ K \ {k1, k2}, both sides of (2.22) remain unchanged
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since for all such k, either k1, k2 ∈ Kωk or k1, k2 /∈ Kωk . (If k2 = k0 the latter
is always true since k1 must be the smuggler’s lowest ranked checkpoint and
k0 6∈ K.) Inequality (2.22) remains satisfied for k = k1 since the right-hand
side remains unchanged and ε = v̂ωk1 − v
ω
k . Finally, for k = k2 6= k0, both sides
of (2.22) increase by ε. So inequality (2.22) holds which implies (2.20d) holds
as well. The rest of the constraints in (2.20) are also satisfied by construction.
This perturbed solution is optimal since rωk1 ≥ r
ω
k2
and has the property that
(2.22) is tight for all k′ ∈ Kωk1 ∪ {k1}. Repeating this perturbation at most
|K||Ω| times we obtain an optimal solution for which (2.22) is tight for all
k ∈ K.
Theorem 12. The optimal value of the LP relaxation of (2.4) with all step
inequalities added is equal to that of the LP relaxation of (2.20).
Proof. By Proposition 9, if we fix x̂ ∈ [0, 1]|K| in (2.4), add the most violated
step inequalities for each scenario, and optimize over θ we obtain:










where zω is the largest right-hand side of all step inequalities for scenario ω.
Since the objective function of (2.4) is
∑
ω∈Ω p
ωθω and is identical to that of
(2.20), it suffices to show that v̂ωk = (mink′∈Kωk x̂k′−x̂k)
+ at an optimal solution
to the LP relaxation of (2.20) for the same fixed x = x̂.
Let ω ∈ Ω and assume without loss of generality that Kωk = {k′ ∈
K : k′ < k}. Then under the indexing for this particular ω, mink′∈Kωk x̂k′ =
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mink′<k x̂k′ . By induction we now show that:
min
k′<k+1














holds for all k ≥ 2. For the base case k = 2 we have:
min(x1, x2) = x1 − (x1 − x2)+ (2.24a)
v̂ω2 = (x̂1 − x̂2)+. (2.24b)
Equation (2.24a) holds since (x1−x2)+ = (x1−x2) if x1 > x2 and (x1−x2)+ = 0
otherwise. Equation (2.24b) holds since by Lemma 11, v̂ω1 = 1 − x̂1 and
v̂ω2 = (1 − x̂2 − v̂ω1 )+ = (x̂1 − x̂2)+. Now assume that (2.23a) holds for an

















by the same argument we made for the base case (2.24a). Thus (2.23a) holds
for all k ≥ 2. Finally, assume (2.23b) holds for an arbitrary k ≥ 2. Lemma 11
then yields:
v̂ωk+1 = (1− x̂k+1 − v̂ω1 − v̂ω2 − · · · − v̂ωk )+
=
(














Finally, we show that the non-dominated auxiliary variables of (2.20)
correspond exactly to the extreme points of the convex hulls of the polyhedra
induced by constraints (2.4c) for each ω ∈ Ω.
Proposition 13. Let Θω = {(x, θω) : θω ≥ rωk (1 − xk), k ∈ K, θω ∈ R+, x ∈
Z|K|+ }, where 0 ≤ rωk ≤ 1, and let (x̂, θ̂ω) be an extreme point of the convex hull
of Θω. Then either θ̂ω = rωk for some k ∈ K or θ̂ω = 0. Moreover, x̂k = 1 if
rωk > θ̂
ω and x̂k = 0 otherwise.
Proof. Suppose that (x̂, θ̂ω) is an extreme point of conv(Θω). Then
θ̂ω ≥ rωmax ≡ max(max
k∈K
rωk (1− x̂k), 0). (2.25)
Now suppose that θ̂ω > rωmax. Then the points (x̂, θ̂
ω + ε) and (x̂, θ̂ω− ε) where
ε = θ̂ω − rωmax are both in Θω. But (x̂, θ̂ω) is a convex combination of these
points and thus cannot be an extreme point of conv(Θω). So θ̂ω = rωmax and
consequently θ̂ω must be either rωk for some k ∈ K or 0. This proves the first
claim.
To prove the second claim, note that if (x̂, θ̂ω) ∈ Θω, then x̂k ≥ 1 for
every k with rωk > θ̂
ω. Now suppose that for some k′ ∈ K, either xk′ ≥ 2 and
rωk′ > θ̂
ω or xk′ ≥ 1 and rωk′ ≤ θ̂ω. Then (x̂+ ek′ , θ̂ω) and (x̂− ek′ , θ̂ω), where ek
is the unit vector with the kth component equal to 1, are both in Θω. Since
(x̂, θ̂ω) is a convex combination of these two points, we must have that x̂k = 1
for all k with rωk > θ̂
ω and x̂k = 0 otherwise.
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The significance of Proposition 13 is that the convex hull of Θω has at most
|K| + 1 extreme points. We can also easily enumerate the extreme directions
of conv(Θω); they are simply (ek, 0), k ∈ K, and (0, 1). Writing conv(Θω) as a
convex combination of its extreme points and a non-negatively weighted lin-
ear combination of its extreme directions results in constraints (2.20c)-(2.20f)
above. If some of the rωk are equal to each other or 0, we have fewer than
|K|+1 extreme points since each extreme point corresponds to a unique value
of θ̂ω. This may seem to be a discrepancy since we always have |K| + 1 aux-
iliary variables per scenario, but can be explained as follows. If multiple vωk
variables have the same coefficient in (2.20c), the variable corresponding to the
smallest |Kωk | will dominate, and only the dominating variable corresponds to
an extreme point. So the strength of the LP relaxation of (2.20) lies in that it
does not allow points (x, θ) feasible to the LP relaxation of (2.4) but for which
(x, θω) does not lie in conv(Θω). See [24] for a survey of tight formulations for
mixed-integer sets similar to that of BiSNIP.
We conclude this section with a transformed version of (2.20) which has
the same LP relaxation value but a sparser constraint matrix. We introduce a
new decision variable uωk which equals 1 if smuggler ω traverses a checkpoint
with a lower evasion probability than that of checkpoint k and 0 otherwise.
Recall that k(i, ω) is smuggler ω’s ith best checkpoint. Then we can relate v
to u as follows
vωk(i,ω) = u
ω
k(i−1,ω) − uωk(i,ω), (2.26)
where uωk(0,ω) ≡ 1 and vωk0 = u
ω
k(|K|,ω), ω ∈ Ω. We can now replace v with u in
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model (2.20) starting with constraint (2.20d) as follows


















Non-negativity constraints on v simply translate into
uωk(i−1,ω) ≥ uωk(i,ω), i = 1, . . . , |K|, ω ∈ Ω.















where rωk(|K|+1,ω) ≡ 0. With























s.t. x ∈ X (2.29b)
xk ≥ uωk , k ∈ K, ω ∈ Ω (2.29c)
uωk(i−1,ω) ≥ uωk(i,ω), i = 2, . . . , |K|, ω ∈ Ω (2.29d)
0 ≤ uωk ≤ 1, k ∈ K,ω ∈ Ω. (2.29e)
We do not include constraint (2.29d) for i = 1 since that would simply reduce
to a simple upper bound 1 ≥ uωk(1,ω). Note that this model is equivalent to
(2.20) since given v, u can be uniquely determined and vice-versa. While
model (2.29) has roughly twice as many structural constraints as (2.20), it has
a sparser constraint matrix for moderate- and large-scale instances since every
constraint other than the budget constraint has only two non-zero terms. We
focus our attention on model (2.29) for the remainder of this chapter. An
advantage to taking the perspective of model (2.29) is that it is identical to,
minus the budget constraint, the shared fixed cost problem introduced by Rhys
[32].
2.6 Efficient Nested Solutions
BiSNIP is strongly NP-complete, even with unit interdiction costs and
equally likely threat scenarios [29]. We now describe a family of instances of
BiSNIP that can be solved in polynomial time by solving a modest number of
linear programs. Given a probability mass function over the scenarios and an
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evasion probability for every scenario-checkpoint pair, we can plot the maxi-
mum decrease in evasion probability, relative to the uninterdicted system, as a
function of the budget by solving a BiSNIP instance for every possible budget
level. We refer to this curve as the efficient frontier of solutions, provided it
increases strictly. In this section we show that the solutions corresponding to
extreme points of the concave envelope of the efficient frontier can be found in
polynomial time (see Figure 2.2). And, given a pair of solutions which both
correspond to extreme points, the checkpoints interdicted in one solution are
a subset of those interdicted in the other. We refer to this as the nestedness
property. Hochbaum [17] shows that this property holds for a related prob-
lem by exploiting the solution properties of an equivalent parametric max-flow
problem. In this section, we show that the nestedness property hinges on a
supermodularity property of the objective function and a submodularity prop-
erty of the cost function. In general, solutions to BiSNIP are not necessarily
nested; see for example [23].
To elaborate further, consider a biobjective integer program in which
one objective is to maximize the decrease in the evasion probability, and the
other is to minimize detector installation costs. A solution for which it is both
impossible to decrease the expected evasion probability without increasing in-
stallation costs and impossible to decrease installation costs without increas-
ing the expected evasion probability is said to be Pareto efficient. Kuhn and
Tucker [20] show that we can find some Pareto efficient solutions by solving
a single-objective program whose objective is a weighted sum of the objec-
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Figure 2.2: An example efficient frontier of solutions. Solutions corresponding
to points A, B, and C can be found in polynomial time and are nested.
tives of the biobjective program. More specifically, every solution to this
single-objective program corresponds to a point on the concave envelope of
the efficient frontier [31].
For our problem, the resulting single-objective program is simply the
Lagrangian relaxation of (2.29) with the budget constraint dualized, which we
now show has an LP relaxation with integral extreme points. We first present
a result linking û to x̂ in an extreme point solution.
Lemma 14. Consider the LP relaxation of model (2.29) with the budget con-
straint
∑
k∈K ckxk ≤ b relaxed and let (x̂, û) be an extreme point solution.
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x̂k(i′,ω), i = 1, . . . , |K|, ω ∈ Ω. (2.30)
Equivalently, we have ûωk ≤ mink′∈K̄ωk x̂k′ for all k ∈ K and ω ∈ Ω. If this
inequality is strict for some k ∈ K and ω ∈ Ω and ûωk > 0, then we can
form two points feasible to the LP relaxation of (2.29) by perturbing ûωk by
ε = min
(






. Since (x̂, û) can be written as a strict convex
combination of these two points, it cannot be an extreme point.
Note that the above argument also holds if the budget constraint is not relaxed,
a fact we use later.
Proposition 15. Let XU be the feasible region of the LP relaxation of (2.29)
with the budget constraint
∑
k∈K ckxk ≤ b relaxed. Then every extreme point
of XU is integer valued.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists (x̂, û) ∈ XU with some component of x̂
or û being fractional. By Lemma 14, if any component of û is fractional then
some component of x̂ is also fractional. Therefore, there exists a non-empty
K ′ ⊆ K such that x̂k is fractional for every k ∈ K ′, and the following pair of
points is feasible:
xk = x̂k + εI(k ∈ K ′), k ∈ K; uωk = ûωk + εI(0 < ûωk < 1), k ∈ K, ω ∈ Ω
xk = x̂k − εI(k ∈ K ′), k ∈ K; uωk = ûωk − εI(0 < ûωk < 1), k ∈ K, ω ∈ Ω,
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where ε = mink∈K′(x̂k, 1 − x̂k) and I(·) is the indicator function. Since (x̂, û)
can be written as a strict convex combination of these two points, we have a
contradiction.
It is also possible to prove Proposition 15 using the fact that the associated
constraint matrix is totally unimodular since every element in the matrix is
0, 1, or -1, every row has at most two non-zero entries, and every row with
two non-zero entries sums to 0. The significance of Proposition 15 is that
we can solve an instance of BiSNIP in polynomial time if the solution to
that instance corresponds to an extreme point of the concave envelope of the
efficient frontier. We can find all such points by solving a parameterized LP.
Alternatively, the Lagrangian relaxation can be cast as a parameterized min-
cut problem [2] and solved efficiently using the push-relabel algorithm [15, 16]
or the pseudoflow algorithm [17]. Note that in general there may exist points
on the efficient frontier that lie below the concave envelope, so this does not
contradict the fact that BiSNIP is NP-complete. We refer to such points as
being convex dominated [31]. We formally describe this notion in the context
of our problem as follows.











Definition 3. Let K̂ ⊆ K. Then K̂ is convex dominated if there exists
K̂−, K̂+ ⊆ K with c(K̂−) ≤ c(K̂) ≤ c(K̂+) and c(K̂−) 6= c(K̂+) such that:
g(K̂) < αg(K̂−) + (1− α)g(K̂+),
where α = c(K̂
+)−c(K̂)
c(K̂+)−c(K̂−) .
Any solution on the concave envelope of the efficient frontier corresponds to
a set of checkpoints K̂ which satisfies g(K̂) ≥ αg(K̂−) + (1− α)g(K̂+) for all
K̂−, K̂+ satisfying the conditions of Definition 3, and for an extreme point of
the efficient frontier’s convex hull, this inequality is strict unless c(K̂) = c(K̂−)
or c(K̂) = c(K̂+).
Before we prove the nestedness property, we present some useful prop-
erties of the gain function and the efficient frontier. First, we show that the
gain function is supermodular (see, e.g., [34]).
Proposition 16. g(·) is a supermodular function. That is, if A ⊂ B ⊆ K
and k′ ∈ A, then
g(A)− g(A \ {k′}) ≤ g(B)− g(B \ {k′}).
Proof. For any K ′ ⊆ K such that k′ ∈ K ′ we have:












where G(K ′, k′) = {(ω, k) : K̄ωk ⊆ K ′, k′ ∈ K̄ωk }. But G(A, k′) ⊆ G(B, k′)
coupled with non-negativity of the gain function’s summand yields the desired
result.
Definition 4. Let A,B ⊆ K satisfy c(A) < c(B). We define the gain-to-cost





Next, we present some useful results regarding sets that are not convex domi-
nated.
Lemma 17. Let A,B,C ⊆ K satisfy c(A) < c(B) < c(C). Then
(a) m(A,C) = αm(A,B) + (1− α)m(B,C) for some α ∈ (0, 1);
(b) if A is not convex dominated then m(A,B) = min{K′⊆K:c(K′)≤c(A)}m(K
′, B);
(c) if B is not convex dominated then m(A,B) = max{K′⊆K:c(K′)≥c(B)}m(A,K
′);
and,
(d) if B is not convex dominated and m(A,C) = m(A,B) = m(B,C), then
neither A nor C is convex dominated.
Proof. With α = c(B)−c(A)
c(C)−c(A) , part (a) holds immediately. We prove part (b) by
contradiction. Suppose that m(A,B) > min{K′⊆K:c(K′)≤c(A)}m(K
′, B). Then
there exists K∗ ⊆ K with c(K∗) ≤ c(A) which satisfies m(A,B) > m(K∗, B).
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If we let α = c(B)−c(A)
c(B)−c(K∗) , then A is convex dominated by K







g(B)− g(A) > α(g(B)− g(K∗)) =⇒
αg(K∗) + (1− α)g(B) > g(A).
Similarly we can prove part (c) by contradiction. Supposem(A,B) < m(A,K∗)
for some K∗ satisfying c(K∗) ≥ c(B). If we let α = c(K
∗)−c(B)
c(K∗)−c(A) , then B is convex







g(B)− g(A) < (1− α)(g(K∗)− g(A)) =⇒
g(B) < αg(A) + (1− α)g(K∗).
Finally, to prove (d) assume that C is convex dominated and satisfiesm(A,C) =
m(A,B) = m(B,C). Then there exists C−, C+ ⊆ K with c(C−) ≤ c(C) ≤
c(C+) and c(C−) 6= c(C+) which satisfy
g(C) < αg(C−) + (1− α)g(C+),
where α = c(C
+)−c(C)
c(C+)−c(C−) . But if c(C) = c(C
−), then g(C−) > g(C) and
m(A,C−) > m(A,C) = m(A,B), contradicting part (c). If c(C) = c(C+)
we would have m(A,C+) > m(A,B) again contradicting part (c). So we can
assume c(C−) < c(C) < c(C+). Then we have








So m(C−, C+) < m(C,C+) and, by part (a), m(C−, C) < m(C,C+). But by
part (c), since c(C+) > c(B) we must have m(A,C+) ≤ m(A,B) = m(A,C),
which by part (a) implies m(C,C+) ≤ m(A,C). To summarize we have
m(C−, C) < m(C,C+) ≤ m(A,C) = m(A,B) = m(B,C).
Now suppose c(C−) < c(B). Since B is not convex dominated and m(C−, C) <
m(B,C), this contradicts part (b). So we must have c(C−) ≥ c(B). Since
m(C−, C) < m(A,C), by part (a) we have m(A,C) < m(A,C−). By hypoth-
esis this implies m(A,B) < m(A,C−) which is a contradiction of part (c).
Similar logic shows that A is also not convex dominated.
Of particular interest is part (c) of Lemma 17, which states that a set of
checkpoints which is not convex dominated maximizes the gain-to-cost ratio
between the set and any other set with smaller cost. In other words, the
solutions that we can find in polynomial time conveniently happen to be those
that maximize the decrease in evasion probability per unit installation cost.
Additionally, we can show that solutions that correspond to corner points
of the concave envelope are nested, that is, any pair of corner point solutions
corresponds to a pair of sets of checkpoints one of whom is a subset of the other.
This can be a desirable property if funds for installing detectors are made
available over time [17, 23]. The nestedness property is a direct consequence
of the following.
Theorem 18. Let A,B ⊆ K. Then if neither A nor B is convex dominated,
then neither AB nor A ∪B is convex dominated.
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Proof. Assume without loss of generality that c(A) ≤ c(B). If A ⊆ B then
AB = A and A ∪ B = B and the result holds by hypothesis. Suppose then
that A 6⊆ B. Then we have c(AB) < c(A) < c(A ∪ B). By Proposition 16
we have that g(A ∪B)− g(B) ≥ g(A)− g(AB), and since c(A ∪B)− c(B) =
c(A)−c(AB) = c(A\B), this implies that m(B,A∪B) ≥ m(AB,A). Also, by
Lemma 17(b) we have m(AB,A∪B) ≥ m(A,A∪B) which implies m(AB,A) ≥
m(A,A ∪B) by Lemma 17(a). Combining these results we have:
m(B,A ∪B) ≥ m(AB,A) ≥ m(A,A ∪B). (2.33)
But by Lemma 17(b), we have m(B,A ∪ B) ≤ m(A,A ∪ B) and so (2.33)
must hold with equality throughout. So m(AB,A) = m(A,A ∪ B) and by
Lemma 17(d), neither AB nor A ∪B is convex dominated.
Corollary 19. Let K1, K2 ⊆ K correspond to points on the concave envelope
of the efficient frontier with c(K1) < c(K2). If either K1 or K2 corresponds to
an extreme point, then K1 ⊂ K2. Moreover, if both K1 and K2 correspond to
extreme points and c(K1) = c(K2), then K1 = K2.
Corollary 19 follows since g(Ki) = αig(K1K2) + (1 − αi)g(K1 ∪K2), i = 1, 2,
for αi =
c(K1∪K2)−c(Ki)
c(K1∪K2)−c(K1K2) , which implies that K1 and K2 do not correspond to
extreme points unless K1 = K1K2 and K2 = K1 ∪ K2. The second part of
the corollary implies that each extreme point corresponds to a unique set of
checkpoints.
We conclude this section by proposing an easy-to-implement algorithm
for generating all extreme points, based on the following observation.
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Proposition 20. Let (x̂, û) be an extreme point solution to the LP relaxation
of (2.29). Then all fractional components of x̂ must be equal.
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that ck ≥ 1,∀k. Suppose there
exists k1, k2 ∈ K such that x̂k1 and x̂k2 are both fractional and x̂k1 6= x̂k2 . Let
K1 = {k ∈ K : x̂k = x̂k1} and K2 = {k ∈ K : x̂k = x̂k2}. By Lemma 14 we
have that if ûωk > 0 then û
ω












|x̂k2 − x̂k′|, x̂k1 , 1− x̂k1 , x̂k2 , 1− x̂k2
}
.
The following two points are feasible to the LP relaxation of (2.29):
xk = x̂k +
ε
c(K1)






I(ûωk = x̂k1)− εc(K2)I(û
ω
k = x̂k2), k ∈ K, ω ∈ Ω
xk = x̂k − εc(K1)I(k ∈ K1) +
ε
c(K2)





k = x̂k1) +
ε
c(K2)
I(ûωk = x̂k2), k ∈ K, ω ∈ Ω.
Since (x̂, û) can be written as a strict convex combination of these two points,
it is not an extreme point.
The algorithm to generate the solutions corresponding to all extreme
points of the efficient frontier’s convex envelope proceeds as follows. Assume
without loss of generality that ck ≥ 1,∀k, and let (x̂, û) be a solution to the LP
relaxation of (2.29) with f = 1. If K∗ ⊆ K indexes the positive components
of x̂ and K∗ 6= ∅, then
∑
k∈K∗ ckx̂k = 1 and x̂k = I(k ∈ K∗)/c(K∗),∀k ∈ K by
Proposition 20. So the objective value is simply g(K∗)/c(K∗) and therefore
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K∗ represents a Pareto-efficient solution which is not convex dominated as it
must solve minK′⊆K g(K
′)/c(K ′). By Corollary 19 and Lemma 17(c), we can
then resolve the LP relaxation of (2.29) with xk fixed to 1 for all k ∈ K∗ and
with f = c(K∗) + 1 to generate the next extreme point. We can generate all
extreme points by iterating in this fashion until we arrive at a solution in which
all checkpoints the smuggler would consider traversing are interdicted. Note
that this algorithm may also generate some points that are on the concave
upper envelope but not extreme points. This algorithm is summarized in the
pseudo-code of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: GetExtremePoints(p, r, c)
Input: Scenario probabilities pω > 0, evasion probabilities rωk ≥ 0, detector
installation costs ck ≥ 1
Output: Sets K1, . . . , Kn ⊆ K corresponding to all extreme points on the




Solve the LP relaxation of (2.29) with b =
∑
k∈Kn ck + 1 and the added
constraints xk = 1, k ∈ Kn and let (x̂, û) be the optimal solution
if Kn = {k ∈ K : x̂k > 0} then
break
end if
Let Kn+1 = {k ∈ K : x̂k > 0}
n← n+ 1




return K1, . . . , Kn
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2.7 Preprocessing
Model (2.29) has an additional |K||Ω| decision variables not present in
(2.4). While the strengthened LP relaxation more than compensates for the
extra variables, we can possibly reduce the size of model (2.29) in two ways.
Our first approach uses the fact that the budget constraint implies that some
of the auxiliary variables must be zero and the second is a generalization of
the scenario aggregation scheme described previously.
Proposition 21. Let K̄ωk = {k′ : rωk′ ≥ rωk } and suppose
∑
k′∈K̄ωk
ck′ > b for
some k ∈ K and ω ∈ Ω. Then uωk = 0 in any feasible solution to (2.29).
Proof. Suppose uωk > 0 and
∑
k′∈K̄ωk
ck′ > b for some k ∈ K and ω ∈ Ω.
Then constraints (2.29c) and (2.29d), coupled with the integrality of x, imply
that xk′ = 1 for all k






ck′xk′ > b, and so u
ω
k must be 0 in any feasible
solution.
Proposition 21 makes use of the fact that smuggler ω traverses a checkpoint
with a lower evasion probability than that of k only if we interdict all check-
points with an evasion probability at least as high as that of k. If interdicting
all such checkpoints consumes more budget than we have, then we can fix the
corresponding uωk to zero. This simple observation can both reduce the number
of variables and greatly strengthen the LP relaxation, especially if the budget
is small relative to the number of checkpoints. To see why the LP relaxation
may be tightened, consider the following example.
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Example 1. Let |Ω| = 1 and |K| = 3 with c1 = c2 = c3 = 1 and r1 = 1,




s.t. u1 ≥ u2
x1 ≥ u1
x2 ≥ u2 (2.35)
x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 1
x1, x2, x3 ∈ {0, 1}
0 ≤ u ≤ 1.
The optimal solution of (2.35) is x∗ = (1, 0, 0), u∗ = (1, 0, 0) which gives a
decrease in the evasion probability of 0.1. But the optimal solution to the LP
relaxation of (2.35) is xLP = (0.5, 0.5, 0), uLP = (0.5, 0.5, 0), giving a decrease
in evasion probability of 0.5. However, u2 > 0 forces x1 = x2 = 1, and so we
can fix u2 = 0 and the optimal solution to the LP relaxation is now integer
feasible.
We now show that we can aggregate some of the auxiliary variables
that remain if a pair of smugglers ranks their checkpoints similarly.
Proposition 22. Consider model (2.29) and suppose that K̄ω1k = K̄
ω2
k for




Proof. Constraints (2.29c) and (2.29d) imply that uωk ≤ mink′∈K̄ωk xk′ . This
inequality is tight for at least one optimal solution to (2.29) since the objec-
tive function coefficients of uωk are all non-negative and there are no other
constraints on u, aside from the simple bound constraints which are auto-






k in at least one optimal
solution.
By Proposition 22, for any ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω and k ∈ K with K̄ω1k = K̄
ω2
k , we can






k . In addition, we can
eliminate a constraint from both (2.29c) and (2.29d).
The hypothesis of Proposition 22 is satisfied if both smugglers ω1 and
ω2 prefer the same set of checkpoints to checkpoint k. This may occur, for
example, if a pair of smugglers shares an origin and have destinations in close
proximity to each other, or vice versa. The pair of smugglers may, therefore,
rank their top checkpoints differently but rank the rest of their checkpoints
identically. This pair of smugglers does not satisfy the strict ordering condition
of Proposition 6 but does, at least for those checkpoints that are identically
ranked, satisfy the ordering condition of Proposition 22 and so at least some
reduction in problem size is possible.
2.8 Branching
We now describe a branching scheme which makes use of the idea,
presented in Proposition 21, that we can eliminate auxiliary variables that, if
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positive, force the budget constraint to be violated. For each smuggler, we can
identify and fix such variables by sorting the checkpoints in order of decreasing




ck′ > b. We can view this as applying a greedy
algorithm to each smuggler in which we interdict the chosen smuggler’s best
uninterdicted checkpoint until the budget is depleted. This greedy algorithm
gives an optimal policy if the interdictor could wait until the smuggler scenario
was revealed and then deploy the detectors, that is, the greedy algorithm
solves the wait-and-see problem. The solution to the wait-and-see problem
provides a lower bound on the conditional evasion probability for each smuggler
scenario, and the auxiliary variables that we fix to zero correspond to scenario-
checkpoint pairs with evasion probabilities smaller than this lower bound.
The potential for the reformulated model to still have weak LP relax-
ation bounds lies with the fact that, if the smugglers do not rank the check-
points similarly, it is impossible to achieve all of these lower bounds simulta-
neously if we must deploy detectors before the smuggler scenario is revealed.
However, as we allocate detectors within a branch-and-bound tree, our re-
maining budget, after having fixed xk = 1 for some subset of checkpoints, will
decrease and likely tighten the lower bounds on some of the conditional evasion
probabilities. We could resolve the wait-and-see problem and fix additional uωk
variables at each node in the tree, but this can be time consuming. This
motivates a branching scheme that allocates detectors as quickly as possible.
So while a standard branching scheme would be to pick a checkpoint k′ with
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xk′ fractional in the LP relaxation and create a subproblem in which xk′ = 0
and another in which xk′ = 1, the scheme we describe here instead branches
on whether an entire subset of checkpoints receives detectors. Then, for each
subproblem generated, we recompute the wait-and-see bounds, fix additional
uωk variables, and finally decide whether to branch on another subset of check-
points or to hand the subproblem off to a general purpose branch-and-bound
solver.
To further motivate this scheme, consider the following. Suppose that,
for a particular smuggler, there exists a subset of checkpoints such that each
checkpoint, if not interdicted, gives the smuggler a path with high evasion
probability. Also suppose that if the entire subset is interdicted that the
smuggler is forced to traverse a path with a much lower evasion probability.
This phenomenon may occur in practical problems if there exists a cluster of
checkpoints in close proximity to each other and, say, the origin for a particular
smuggler. If this subset of checkpoints also provides paths with high evasion
probabilities to some other smugglers, we have strong reason to believe that
the entire subset should be interdicted in an optimal solution. To check this
hypothesis, we can generate two subproblems: one in which every checkpoint
in the subset is interdicted and one in which at least one checkpoint in the
subset is not interdicted. So if S is the subset of checkpoints we think should
be interdicted, we create one subproblem in which
∑
k∈S xk = |S| and another
in which
∑
k∈S xk ≤ |S|−1. We refer to the creation of the former subproblem
as “branching up” and the latter as “branching down.” The benefit of this
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scheme is that it allows us, if the subset S is intelligently chosen, to fix several
extra variables in the subproblems that could not be fixed at the root node.
The following result describes how extra variables may be fixed.
Proposition 23. Consider model (2.29) and let S ⊂ K. Then
(i)
∑





k∈S xk ≤ |S| − 1 implies that uωk = 0 for all k ∈ K and ω ∈ Ω such that
S ⊆ K̄ωk .
Proof. Part (i) follows from the fact that, if uωk > 0, then xk′ = 1 for all
k′ ∈ K̄ωk . But
∑
k∈S xk = |S| implies that xk = 1 for all k ∈ S. If interdict-
ing all checkpoints that are either in K̄ωk or S exceeds the budget, that is if∑
k′∈K̄ωk ∪S
ck′ > b, then (2.29) is infeasible. Part (ii) follows immediately by
noting that uωk > 0 implies that
∑
k′∈K̄ωk
xk′ = |K̄ωk |, which in turn implies that∑
k∈S xk = |S| if S ⊆ K̄ωk .
We choose a subset S to branch on so that each of the subproblems
generated makes significant progress towards feasibility. The size of set S
provides a measure of how much progress is made branching up since a larger
S leads to more variables being fixed in the resulting subproblem. To ensure
significant progress is made branching down, S should be chosen such that
some of the components of u which were positive in the solution to the LP
relaxation of the parent problem are fixed to 0 in the subproblem. Since
increasing the size of S typically leads to fewer components of u being fixed
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in the branch down, there is an inherent tradeoff between the progress made
in one branch and the progress made in the other.
We quantify the progress made in the branch down as follows. If we
view (2.29) as a reward collecting problem in which a reward sωk is earned when
the variable uωk is set to 1, then given a subset S and a feasible LP relaxation
solution (x̂, û), we can compute the total reward earned by the LP relaxation










Ideally, we seek a subset that maximizes this loss function for each potential
subset size t, then pick some subset along this efficient frontier of solutions.
Since maximizing the loss function for a fixed subset size t is as hard as solving
an instance of BiSNIP, we instead greedily approximate this efficient frontier





and let St = St−1 ∪ {k∗}, where k∗ is the maximizer.
Once we have an approximation for the efficient frontier, we must
choose amongst its members a subset on which to branch. In our compu-
tational experiments, we choose to branch on the subset St∗ , where t
∗ ∈
argmax1≤t≤b t · Losst. The idea behind this choice is that it should promote
solutions near the center of our approximated efficient frontier and guarantee
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that each branch makes positive progress. In order to obtain an integer feasi-
ble solution as quickly as possible, we use a depth-first node selection strategy
in which the branch up is evaluated before the branch down. A pseudo-code
representation of the customized branch-and-bound algorithm can be found in
Appendix A.
2.9 Computational Results
In this section, we discuss results from US model instances, restricting
attention to land border crossings entering the continental US from Mexico
and Canada. Using a North American road network, we model 7 origins in
Mexico, 7 origins in Canada and 10 destinations in the US, giving a total
of |Ω| = 140 threat scenarios. Since all detectors are identical, we use a
cardinality-constrained special case of the BiSNIP model, i.e., ck = 1, for all
k ∈ K, in constraint set X, and we solve the model for various budget val-
ues, b, representing the number of border crossings equipped with detectors.
Each checkpoint has an indigenous evasion probability based on its perceived
vulnerability, pk, and this varies by checkpoint, k. However, facing the same
threat specified by ω, we assume detectors in distinct locations behave identi-
cally and the probability a smuggler evades detection, by the detector, is qω,
which does not depend on k. If a detector is installed at k we assume both the
indigenous detection capability and the detector technology are independently
employed so that qωk used in (2.2d) is given by q
ω
k = q
ωpk. If ω only specifies the
origin-destination pair (e.g., because distinct shielding scenarios have already
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been aggregated) then we can drop q’s dependence on ω so that qωk = qpk for
some constant q. The indigenous evasion probabilities are based on a multi-
attribute factor model described in detail in [40]. All of the MIPs associated
with both sets of BiSNIP instances were solved via the commercially-available
CPLEX software [10].
Figure 2.3 shows the 136 motor-crossing checkpoints we consider. The
figure also indicates four clusters of checkpoints important in results we de-
scribe below. We again solve the associated BiSNIP instances for a range of
values of b, the number of detectors we can install. These hedge against 140
origin-destination threat scenarios, with half originating in Canada and the
other half in Mexico. In addition to ranging b we assume the effectiveness of
the detection equipment is independent of the scenario and checkpoint, that is
qωk = qpk for some constant q. We create multiple model instances by ranging
the value of q.
Figure 2.4 shows the optimal evasion probability over all threat sce-
narios versus the budget for four values of the detector effectiveness, q. The
evasion probability is reported as a fraction of that when no detectors are in-
stalled. Significant jumps in the graph occur when we are given just enough
detectors to interdict an entire cluster of checkpoints. For example, we notice
a large decrease in the evasion probability as the budget increases to b = 34
as such a budget allows us to interdict every checkpoint along the Mexican
border. Smaller but still significant jumps occur when the budget increases
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Figure 2.3: The figure shows 136 motor-crossing checkpoints from Canada
and Mexico into the continental United States, and groups the checkpoints
into four clusters.
to 11, allowing us to interdict all checkpoints in Mexico east of Big Bend (see
Figure 2.5), and when the budget increases to b = 97, allowing us to interdict
all checkpoints in Mexico and all checkpoints in Canada west of Lake Huron
(see Figure 2.6a and 2.6b).
Also noteworthy is the fact that for small values of the budget (b <
11), the optimal solution interdicts checkpoints along the Great Lakes (see
Figure 2.5a). Intuitively this is because there are more gaps between those
checkpoints than there are anywhere else. Finally, we note that the solutions
did vary as detectors become less effective. A notable example of this is that
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with more effective detectors (q = 0, 0.25, 0.5), there is an incentive to shift all
detectors from eastern Canada to western Canada when the budget increases
from 96 to 97. This was not the case with the most ineffective detectors
(q = 0.75) as such detectors could not convince smugglers with origins in
western Canada to travel around the Great Lakes to traverse a detector-free
checkpoint (see Figure 2.6c).
Figure 2.4: The figure shows the improvement factor as a function of the num-
ber of detectors installed for the US model. The four plots correspond to differ-
ent levels of effectiveness of the detectors, specifically, with q = 0.75, 0.50, 0.25
and 0 in qωk = qpk.
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To show the value of using wait-and-see bounds and reformulation
(2.29), we report optimality gaps for perfectly reliable detectors, q = 0, and
various budget levels b under the following configurations: (1) Model (2.4);
(2) Model (2.4) with (2.5); (3) Model (2.29); (4) Model (2.29) with the pre-
processing suggested by Proposition 21. Table 2.1 reports optimality gaps
as percentages of the optimal unconditional evasion probability given by the
optimal value to (2.4).
To show the value of the various computational enhancements proposed
in this chapter, we report solution times for perfectly reliable detectors, q = 0,
and various budget levels b under the following configurations: (1) Model
(2.4) with (2.5) (BASE); (2) Model (2.29) using Proposition 21 (REF); (3)
Model (2.29) using Propositions 21 and 22 (REF-AGG); (4) Model (2.29) using
Propositions 21 and 22 solved by the customized branch-and-bound algorithm
of Section 2.8 (REF-AGG-C). Table 2.2 reports solution times in seconds. The
computation times reported were on a 3.73 GHz Dell Xeon dual-processor




b (2.4) (2.5) (2.29) (2.29)
10 17.5 0.53 14.3 0.116
20 31.2 2.01 28.1 0.327
30 53.7 2.89 50.9 1.46
40 11.3 3.62 3.49 0
50 22.0 6.14 11.8 0.964
60 32.4 6.08 20.8 0.456
70 49.4 14.2 36.3 6.67
80 69.0 21.0 54.2 13.1
90 101 31.3 83.4 23.8
100 139 40.9 117 33.8
Table 2.1: Optimality gaps as percentages of optimal unconditional evasion
probabilities for US model instances with perfectly reliable detectors, q = 0.
b BASE REF REF-AGG REF-AGG-C
10 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.06
20 1.9 2.5 1.3 0.15
30 3.4 7.3 1.2 0.17
40 2.3 1.56 0.4 0.16
50 4.9 12 2.6 0.32
60 14 29 6.5 0.39
70 194 162 53 1.3
80 1332 311 70 1.6
90 × 1235 113 2.6
100 1133 1904 80 2.9
Table 2.2: Solution times in seconds for US model instances with perfectly
reliable detectors, q = 0. × indicates that the solution time exceeded 2 hours.
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(a) b = 10
(b) b = 11
Figure 2.5: Part (a) of the figure shows the optimal solution to the US model
instance with perfectly reliable detectors, q = 0, and with a budget to install
detectors at b = 10 locations. Part (b) of the figure is identical but for b = 11.
Note that the full number of checkpoints are not visible in the map due to
their close proximity.
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(a) b = 96 and q = 0
(b) b = 97 and q = 0
(c) b = 97 and q = 0.75
Figure 2.6: Part (a) of the figure shows the optimal solution to the US model
instance with perfectly reliable detectors, q = 0, and with a budget to install
detectors at b = 96 locations. Part (b) of the figure is identical but for f = 97.
Part (c) of the figure is for b = 97 and q = 0.75.
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Chapter 3
Two-Person Zero-Sum Games for Network
Interdiction
3.1 Introduction
This chapter considers game-theoretic models for nuclear smuggling de-
tection. In the previous chapter, we consider a stochastic network interdiction
problem in which a smuggler of nuclear material chooses a maximum-reliability
path through a transportation network with full knowledge of the locations of
the locations of radiation detectors installed by an interdictor. In Section 3.2
we consider a variant of this problem in which we assume that the smug-
gler knows the locations of the detectors only via a probability distribution.
The resulting model is a two-person zero-sum Cournot game. We give some
complexity results and discuss solution techniques. Section 3.3 describes two-
person zero-sum game models in which one player, subject to a budget con-
straint, may add strategies to his own strategy set or remove strategies from
his opponent’s strategy set. We conclude in Section 3.4 by describing a model
in which only a subset of detector locations are revealed to the smuggler.
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3.2 TPZSCGs with Exponentially Many Strategies
3.2.1 Motivation
We consider a zero-sum Cournot-game with two opposing parties, an
interdictor and an evader. Suppose that the interdictor, in an attempt to
thwart smuggling attempts, has a fixed budget with which he can deploy de-
tectors to a set of border checkpoints indexed by j ∈ J . Then suppose that
an evader wishing to cross the border must choose a checkpoint from J . If
the evader attempts to cross checkpoint j and no detector is installed then he
evades detection with probability pj. If checkpoint j has a detector installed,
the evasion probability is instead qj < pj. Since the interdictor seeks to mini-
mize the evasion probability and the evader seeks to maximize it, this problem
can be modeled as a two-person zero-sum game.
If the deployment of detectors is transparent, that is, if the evader
knows which checkpoints received detectors, then this problem can be modeled
as a Stackelberg game. This case has been discussed extensively in [25, 26].
We examine the case where the evader knows the problem parameters (pj, qj,
and the interdiction budget and costs) but cannot see where detectors have
been deployed. In this case since the evader is unaware of the actions taken
by the interdictor, the two parties effectively make their respective decisions
simultaneously and so a Cournot model is appropriate. We may prefer a
Cournot model if, for example, all checkpoints are equipped with a “black
box” that is indistinguishable from a real detector and the interdictor then
places a real detector in some subset of the black boxes. Alternatively, suppose
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that all checkpoints already have detectors installed and that the interdictor
can “upgrade” some subset of these detectors but the upgraded detectors are
indistinguishable from the original detectors.
3.2.2 Single-Evader Model
In the following TPZSCG, the interdictor is the row player and the
evader the column player. The model concerns a geographic region in which
the evader begins. The interdictor’s goal is to contain the evader in this
region by detecting any attempt to cross the region’s border. Each of the
interdictor’s pure strategies represents a feasible deployment of detectors across
the border checkpoints, and each of the evader’s pure strategies represents
a checkpoint to cross. So our payoff matrix has a row for each subset of
checkpoints on which the interdictor can install detectors, without exceeding
the budget, and a column for each checkpoint. The evader’s goal is to find
a mixed strategy, here a probability distribution over the checkpoints, which
maximizes the probability that he crosses the border undetected, while the
interdictor’s goal is to find a probability distribution over all feasible detector




i ∈ I feasible detector deployments the interdictor can choose
j ∈ J checkpoints the evader can choose
Data
cj cost of installing a detector at checkpoint j
b total budget for installing detectors
pj probability evader can traverse j undetected when no detector is
installed
qj probability evader can traverse j undetected when a detector is
installed
Aij game’s payoff if evader selects checkpoint j to cross and interdictor
selects detector deployment i, i.e., Aij = qj if deployment i places a
detector at checkpoint j and otherwise Aij = pj. Here, for each row
i ∈ I we have
∑
j∈J cjI(Aij = qj) ≤ b, where I(·) is the indicator
function
Decision Variables
xi probability that the interdictor chooses detector deployment i








Aijyj : xi, i ∈ I (3.1b)∑
j∈J
yj = 1 (3.1c)
yj ≥ 0, j ∈ J. (3.1d)
The right-hand side of constraint (3.1b) is the evasion probability associated
with detector deployment i ∈ I, and the evader’s checkpoint-selection strategy
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y. The constraint has the effect of selecting the minimum of these evasion
probabilities over all detector deployments i ∈ I, and the evader seeks to
maximize that value. The optimal dual variables xi, i ∈ I, on constraints
(3.1b) define an optimal mixed strategy over all feasible detector deployments.
It may seem that in this model the evader must place a probability dis-
tribution across the checkpoints first and then the interdictor picks a detector
deployment that hedges optimally against the evader’s distribution. That is,
it seems that we are forcing the evader to act first. However, if we were to
reverse the order of the decisions and have the interdictor pick a distribution
first, we would arrive at a formulation which is the dual of (3.1). So although
one might view the decisions in this model as taking place sequentially, the
allowance of mixed strategies implies simultaneous decisions by the players.
Model (3.1) is an LP with |I| + 1 structural constraints, and since |I|
is the number of feasible detector deployments, the number of constraints is
of exponential size. For example, if cj = 1, j ∈ J , b = 20, and |J | = 100,









. However, the bulk of
these constraints are irrelevant, that is, they are slack at an optimal solution.
More specifically, in our setting, J is of modest size, and we know that at an
optimal extreme point, at most |J | − 1 of the constraints (3.1b) have positive
dual variables xi, i ∈ I. In later sections we describe how the weighted majority
algorithm can be used to find approximate solutions to (3.1). Here, we describe
a row-generation scheme which can solve model (3.1) exactly and gives insights
into its complexity. We first solve a relaxation of model (3.1) with constraints
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(3.1b) defined over I ′ ⊂ I. Solving the associated LP, we obtain ŷ and λ̂ as
well as dual multipliers x̂. Then, we determine whether ŷ and λ̂ are feasible
to the original problem, i.e., with (3.1b) defined on set I. If not, we find the
most violated constraint (3.1b). This assessment and identification is carried
out via solving a so-called separation problem.
This separation problem is equivalent to finding a detector deployment
that minimizes the evasion probability given that the evader’s mixed strategy
is ŷ. Since λ appears on the left-hand side of all the constraints in (3.1b), we







We can express Aij = pj − (pj − qj)zj, where zj equals 1 one if a detector
is installed on checkpoint j and zj equals 0 otherwise, and the set Z = {z :∑
j∈J cjzj ≤ b, zj ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ J} enumerates all feasible detector deployments





(pj − qj)ŷjzj. (3.3)
Model (3.3) is a knapsack problem and is NP-hard. It can be solved, however,
in pseudo-polynomial time using dynamic programming. Given an optimal




[pj − (pj − qj)z∗j ]ŷj. (3.4)
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If so, then the current solution (x̂, ŷ) solves (3.1). If not then z∗ yields a new
row i∗ with Ai∗ = (pj−(pj−qj)z∗j )j∈J . We replace I ′ with I ′∪{i∗}, re-solve the
associated relaxation of (3.1), and repeat until (3.4) is satisfied. Alternatively,
we know the optimal solution to (3.1) defined over a subset I ′ ⊂ I yields an
optimal value v̄ ≥ v∗. And, the value
∑
j∈J [pj − (pj − qj)z∗j ]ŷj ≤ v∗ because
it corresponds to a feasible strategy of the evader coupled with an optimal
response of the interdictor. If these upper and lower bounds on v∗ are within
ε we may terminate with an ε-optimal solution. In this case the interdictor
cannot decrease the evasion probability by more than ε by deviating from the
mixed strategy suggested by this near-optimal solution to the model.
3.2.3 Multiple-Evader Model
Now say that instead of a single evader, a random evader ω ∈ Ω is
chosen according to a probability distribution pω known to the interdictor.
Each evader may have different evasion probabilities pωj and q
ω
j . Let y
ω
j be
evader ω’s mixed strategy and let Aωij be defined for each evader in a fashion
analogous to that for the single-evader model. Then the multiple-evader model
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xi = 1 : λ (3.5b)∑
j∈J
yωj = 1, ω ∈ Ω (3.5c)
xi ≥ 0, i ∈ I (3.5d)
yωj ≥ 0, j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω. (3.5e)
Here we take the view that the interdictor is playing a game against multiple
evaders, one of whom is selected according to pω. Each evader has a different
payoff matrix Aω as evasion probabilities may vary across evaders. Again,
since the objective (3.5a) is concave in y = [yω]ω∈Ω for fixed x and convex in
x for fixed y and the feasible regions for x and y are both convex, we may
interchange the “max” and the “min” and obtain the same optimal value, v∗.
So, we can view the formulation as having an interdictor and multiple evaders
decide on strategies simultaneously, but then only one evader (selected by pω)
is realized.
If we (a) fix y to create an LP with variables x, (b) define λ as the dual
variable for the single structural constraint in that LP, (c) take the dual of the
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j : xi, i ∈ I (3.6b)∑
j∈J
yωj = 1, ω ∈ Ω (3.6c)
yωj ≥ 0, j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω. (3.6d)
Constraint set (3.6b) contains an exponential number of constraints, most of
which are slack at a basic feasible solution. So we can solve relaxations of (3.6)
with constraints (3.6b) only defined over a subset, I ′ ⊂ I, of feasible detector
deployments to obtain ŷ and λ̂ as well as dual variables x̂, then identify the
most violated constraint in (3.6b) and add the associated detector deployment
to I ′. To identify the most violated constraint in (3.6b) for some ŷ and λ̂ we find
the constraint with the smallest right-hand side. Mimicking the development







pω(pωj − qωj )ŷωj zj. (3.7)






pω[pωj − (pωj − qωj )z∗j ]ŷωj , (3.8)
and identifies a violated row i∗ otherwise. We can view model (3.7) as finding
the best response to the mixed strategies of all the evaders in Ω. If the row i∗
corresponding to that best response is not already in I ′, then it is added to I ′
and the relaxation is resolved.
85
3.2.4 Cardinality-Constrained Case
Here we adapt an idea from [39] to simplify model (3.5) in the case
where the detector installation cost is constant over all border checkpoints.
Letting θω be the dual variables of constraints (3.6c) and taking the dual of











j , j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω (3.9b)∑
i∈I
xi = 1 : λ (3.9c)
0 ≤ xi, i ∈ I. (3.9d)
Model (3.9) has exponentially many variables but can be reduced to a model
with |Ω| + |J | variables if we assume that cj = 1 for all j ∈ J . We define the
strategy-checkpoint incidence matrix D by
Dij =
{
1 if strategy i places a detector on checkpoint j
0 otherwise.
If we define x̂j =
∑
i∈I Dijxi, j ∈ J, and express Aωij = pωj + (qωj − pωj )Dij, then
















= pω(pωj + (q
ω
j − pωj )x̂j).
Since
∑
i∈I xi = 1, we know that x̂j =
∑













s.t. θω ≥ pω(pωj + (qωj − pωj )x̂j), j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω (3.10b)∑
j∈J
x̂j = b (3.10c)
0 ≤ x̂j ≤ 1, j ∈ J. (3.10d)
This is a linear program with |J | + |Ω| variables and |J ||Ω| + 1 structural
constraints. For any (x, θ) pair that is feasible to (3.9), the pair (DTx, θ) is
feasible to (3.10), and so (3.10) is clearly a relaxation to (3.9). The following
result shows that we can also map x̂ back to x and so the optimal values of
(3.9) and (3.10) are in fact equal.
Proposition 24. For every (x̂, θ) which is feasible to (3.10), there exists an
(x, θ) with DTx = x̂ which is feasible to (3.9).
Proof. We must show that the system DTx = x̂, eTx = 1, x ≥ 0 always has
a solution, where we again use e to denote the vector of all 1s. Summing the
constraints of DTx = x̂ and dividing by b yields eTx = 1, so that constraint
is redundant. It suffices to show, therefore, that there exists a solution to
DTx = x̂, x ≥ 0. By Farkas’ lemma that system has a solution if and only if
the system πDT ≤ 0, πx̂ > 0 does not have a solution. πDT ≤ 0 implies that∑
j∈J Dijπj ≤ 0, i ∈ I. Since vector (Dij)j∈J has exactly b components equal
to 1 and the rest are zero, these inequalities can be written as
∑
j∈J ′ πj ≤ 0
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j∈J x̂j = b and x̂ is bounded above by 1 componentwise. Therefore
πDT ≤ 0, πx̂ > 0 has no solution andDTx = x̂, x ≥ 0 must have a solution.
Given x̂ which solves (3.10) we can find a corresponding x which solves









Dijxi + sj = x̂j : πj, j ∈ J
0 ≤ xi, i ∈ I
0 ≤ sj, j ∈ J.









Dijπj ≤ 0 : xi, i ∈ I (3.12b)
πj ≤ 1 : sj, j ∈ J. (3.12c)
Since constraint set (3.12b) is exponentially sized, we use row gener-
ation to solve (3.12). Given an optimal solution π̂ to a relaxation of (3.12)
with constraint set (3.12b) only defined over I ′ ⊂ I, we can identify the most
violated of the relaxed constraints by maximizing
∑
j∈J Dijπ̂j over all i ∈ I.
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For any given i ∈ I, the vector (Dij)j∈J has exactly b components equal to
1, so this maximization can be done by finding the b largest values of π̂j over
j ∈ J . If the sum of these b largest values is non-positive then the current
solution π̂ solves (3.12) and the dual variables of (3.12b) are a solution to the
system Dx = x̂, x ≥ 0. Otherwise we add the corresponding row to I ′ and
repeat. Alternatively, as we describe in the following section, we may use the
weighted majority algorithm to find an approximate solution to the game. We
conclude by noting that the ability to compute the value of the game v∗ for
this special case by solving a polynomially-sized linear program facilitates the
development of an extension of model (3.5) in which some subset of detectors
are visible to the smuggler. We return to this idea in Section 3.4.
3.2.5 Weighted Majority
We now describe how the weighted majority algorithm can be used to
generate a near-optimal solution to (3.5). Every iteration, t = 1, . . . , T , of the
weighted majority algorithm can be viewed as a fictitious play of the game in
the following sense. We take the perspective of the smugglers ω ∈ Ω, for whom
we maintain weights wt,ωj for every checkpoint j ∈ J and iteration t = 1, . . . , T





where β(ω) ∈ (0, 1) is an appropriately chosen constant and lt,ωj is the loss if
smuggler ω traverses checkpoint j in iteration t. We describe how both are








, j ∈ J, t = 1, . . . , T,











where X = {x ∈ R|I|+ :
∑
i∈I xi = 1}. There exists at least one pure-strategy
best response, which can be computed by solving a problem of the form (3.7).
Each loss lt,ωj is chosen to be the detection probability for checkpoint j and
smuggler ω given the interdictor’s best response, that is, lt,ωj =
∑
i∈I(1−Aωij)xti.
This gives lt,ωj = 1−pωj if the interdictor’s best response is to allocate a detector





2 ln |J |
L̃(ω)
, ω ∈ Ω.
where L̃(ω) is an upper bound on the detection probability for smuggler ω.
Nominally we may choose L̃(ω) = T minj∈J(1− qωj ). A possibly tighter choice




s.t. θω ≥ pωj + (qωj − pωj )x̂j, j ∈ J, (3.14)∑
j∈J
cjx̂j = b (3.15)
0 ≤ x̂j ≤ 1, j ∈ J. (3.16)
We note that (3.13) can be solved efficiently via a greedy algorithm.
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2L̃(ω) ln |J |
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.
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3.3 Optimal Design of a Two-Person Zero-Sum Cournot
Game
In a two-person game, the players’ actions are modeled as taking place
either simultaneously or sequentially. Game theoreticians refer to the former
case as a Cournot game and the latter as a Stackelberg game. Since in reality
players usually do not act at the exact same moment in time, the modeling
choice between a Cournot and a Stackelberg game typically depends upon
whether one player can acquire knowledge of the other player’s action. If the
player who acts second (the second-mover) is not aware of the first-mover’s
action, then the players are effectively choosing their strategies simultaneously
and a Cournot model is appropriate.
These two models can be viewed as extreme since they assume that the
first-mover’s actions are either all transparent or all non-transparent to the
second-mover. In this section we consider models that are “hybrids” of the
Cournot and Stackelberg models in that some of the first-mover’s actions are
revealed to the second-mover and others are not. To accomplish this, we start
with a standard Cournot game but allow the first-mover to make transparent
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“design” decisions which alter the payoff matrix of the game. In particular,
we discuss two models: one in which the first-mover can purchase additional
pure strategies for his own use during the game, and another in which the
first-mover can remove some of the second-mover’s pure strategies. In both
cases the first-mover is subject to a budget constraint which limits the number
of pure strategies he can add or remove.
3.3.1 Investing in Premium Strategies
We consider a variant of a TPZSCG in which there are two versions
of each column strategy: a “free” version which can be played at no cost and
a “premium” version which can only be played if the column player invests
in that strategy in the design stage. The column player has a limited budget
and must make these investments via a binary variable tj, j ∈ J , before the
TPZSCG is played. If the premium strategy j ∈ J has been selected in this
design stage, and then the row player chooses i ∈ I and the column player
chooses j ∈ J , the payoff is Aij. If the respective players choose i and j when
premium strategy j has not been selected the payoff is Bij where Aij ≥ Bij.
The investments tj, j ∈ J , are discrete in nature and are transparent to the row
player. After t has been selected, each player places a probability distribution
on the available strategies in the induced TPZSCG. Through these discrete
premium choices we optimally design a TPZSCG, from the perspective of the
column player. This problem can be formulated as follows:
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Indices and Sets
i ∈ I indexes the row player’s pure strategies
j ∈ J indexes the column player’s pure strategies
Data
cj cost of investing in premium strategy j
b investment budget
Aij game’s payoff if the row player plays strategy i and the column
player plays the premium version of strategy j
Bij game’s payoff if the row player plays strategy i and the column
player plays the free version of strategy j
uj upper bound on the probability that the column player plays the
premium version of strategy j
Row Player’s Decision Variables
xi probability that the row player plays strategy i
Column Player’s Decision Variables
tj takes value 1 if the column player invests in strategy j and 0
otherwise
yj probability that the column player plays the premium version of
strategy j


















xi = 1 : θ (3.20b)∑
j∈J
(yj + zj) = 1 (3.20c)∑
j∈J
cjtj ≤ b (3.20d)
0 ≤ xi, i ∈ I (3.20e)
0 ≤ yj ≤ tj, j ∈ J (3.20f)
0 ≤ zj, j ∈ J (3.20g)
tj ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ J. (3.20h)
The outer maximization with respect to t selects premium strategies, sub-
ject to a knapsack constraint, (3.20d) and (3.20h). The order of the inner
maxy,z minx can be equivalently written minx maxy,z. The decisions x and
(y, z) may be viewed as being made simultaneously and are governed by the
respective convexity constraints (3.20b), (3.20e) and (3.20c), (3.20f), (3.20g).
Constraint (3.20f) also disallows playing premium strategy yj if it has not been
selected via tj. When tj = 1 we are allowed to select yj and nominally, that is
limited only by 1.
3.3.2 Tightening the Formulation
In what follows, we replace constraint (3.20f) by 0 ≤ yj ≤ ujtj, j ∈ J ,
and seek values of uj, j ∈ J , so that the new model is equivalent to model
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(3.20), i.e., with uj = 1. As we show, tightening the values of uj, j ∈ J ,
improves our ability to solve model (3.20) and this plays a key role in our
solution strategy described below. With θ denoting the dual variable on con-
straint (3.20b), we fix the decisions in the outer maximization, t, y, z, and take








(Aijyj +Bijzj), i ∈ I (3.21b)∑
j∈J
(yj + zj) = 1 (3.21c)∑
j∈J
cjtj ≤ b (3.21d)
0 ≤ yj ≤ ujtj, j ∈ J (3.21e)
0 ≤ zj, j ∈ J (3.21f)
tj ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ J. (3.21g)
The parameters uj, j ∈ J, are upper bounds on the probability the column
player plays the premium version of strategy j. If uj = 1 for all j ∈ J , model
(3.21) tends to have a very weak linear programming relaxation: Constraint
(3.21d) is redundant if we allow t to be continuous and b ≥ maxj∈J cj. Un-
less we can obtain tighter upper bounds on yj, j ∈ J , relaxing t’s integrality
constraints is equivalent to allowing use of all premium strategies without in-
vestment. Therefore, naive application of a branch-and-bound algorithm is
computationally ineffective. It is crucial, therefore, to make uj, j ∈ J, as small
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as possible without eliminating (all) optimal solutions to model (3.20). We
refer to such u-values as being valid.
To find tighter valid upper bounds on y, suppose we have valid values
for uj, j ∈ J, (e.g., initially uj = 1, j ∈ J) and a feasible solution to (3.21), and
let v be the associated objective function value. We know v ≤ v∗ and that if
we wish to improve upon this lower bound we must achieve a payoff greater







(Aijyj +Bijzj), i ∈ I (3.22b)
(3.21c)− (3.21g). (3.22c)
The linear programming relaxation of model (3.22) allows use of all premium
strategies without prior investment. Ignoring this potential concern allows
(3.22) to be solved quickly but may result in loose values of uj. Still, our
preliminary computational experience has shown that the bounds generated
by (3.22) tend to be significantly less than 1 and that using these bounds to
tighten model (3.21) can significantly improve its solution time when using a
branch-and-bound solver.
Solving model (3.22) as a mixed-integer program generates tighter bounds
on y but could result in |J | auxiliary problems that are essentially as difficult
to solve as model (3.21). However, we can generate an instance of model (3.22)
for each j′ ∈ J and solve those instances in parallel with an instance of model
(3.21). While the tightest upper bounds come from solving model (3.22) to
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optimality, relaxations also produce valid upper bounds on y. So, these in-
stances of (3.22) can periodically report their progress, specifically their best
linear-programming relaxation upper bound, so far. These are then reported
both to model (3.21) and to other instances of model (3.22). As using smaller
uj can greatly speed the solution time of model (3.21), all problem instances
can benefit from the improved bounds. In simplest form, these computations
can run on |J |+1 computing nodes. For practical problems the number of col-
umn strategies |J | can be large, e.g., in the hundreds or much larger. Clearly
for larger models, multiple instances of (3.22) are solved on each computing
node.
3.3.3 Removing an Opponent’s Premium Strategies
Suppose we alter the previous model by giving control of the decision
variables tj, j ∈ J, to the row player and inverting their role so that they now
forbid, instead of allow, the use of the premium strategies. That is, the column
player can use premium strategy j if and only if the associated tj = 0. Also, let
cj be the row player’s cost of removing premium strategy j from the column




















xi = 1 (3.23b)∑
j∈J
(yj + zj) = 1 : λ (3.23c)∑
j∈J
cjtj ≤ b (3.23d)
0 ≤ xi, i ∈ I (3.23e)
0 ≤ yj, j ∈ J (3.23f)
0 ≤ zj, j ∈ J (3.23g)
tj ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ J. (3.23h)
The term −
∑
j∈J πjtjyj in the objective guarantees that yj = 0 if the corre-
sponding tj = 1, provided that πj is sufficiently large. We fix the decisions
in the outer minimizations, t, x, and take the dual of the inner maximization
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Bijxi : zj, j ∈ J (3.24c)∑
i∈I
xi = 1 (3.24d)∑
j∈J
cjtj ≤ b (3.24e)
0 ≤ xi, i ∈ I (3.24f)
tj ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ J. (3.24g)
The decision variables yj are now the dual variables of constraints (3.24b).
For sufficiently large πj, setting some tj to 1 will force the corresponding
constraint in (3.24b) to be slack and the corresponding dual variable yj to
be 0. Excessively large πj, however, can result in a weak linear programming
relaxation and so we focus our efforts on making πj as small as possible and




i − λ∗ for at least
one (x∗, λ∗) optimal to (3.24). To find valid values for the πj we can solve the





Aij′xi − λ (3.25a)
s.t. (3.24b)− (3.24g). (3.25b)
Of course, any upper bound on the optimal solution to (3.25) also provides
a valid choice for πj, so we may relax the integrality constraints and solve
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(3.25) as an LP or use the best remaining upper bound from an incomplete
branch-and-bound tree. We may solve (3.25) without an upper bound v̄ on
v∗, although if such a bound is available we can add the constraint λ ≤ v̄ to
the formulation.
3.3.4 Complexity
Call the model of Sections 2.1-2.2 in which the column player invests
in premium strategies, Add-TPZSCG, and call the model of Section 2.3 in
which the row player can invest to forbid use of such a premium strategy
Remove-TPZSCG. We now show that we can reduce the VERTEX-COVER
problem to the decision versions of both Add-TPZSCG and Remove-TPZSCG
and thus both problems are strongly NP-complete. The following defines the
VERTEX-COVER problem:
VERTEX-COVER:
INSTANCE: Graph G(V,E), a positive integer k ≤ |V |.
QUESTION: Does there exist a subset V ′ ⊂ V such that |V ′| ≤ k and
that every edge in E is adjacent to at least one vertex in V ′?
For the following, we assume unit costs to add or remove a premium
strategy, cj = 1, j ∈ J , and a payoff of zero under all free strategies, B = 0.
Add-TPZSCG-DECISION:
INSTANCE: Payoff matrix Aij, i ∈ I, j ∈ J , positive integer b ≤ |J |,
and a real α.
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QUESTION: Does there exist a subset J ′ ⊂ J of columns in A with
|J ′| = b and non-negative weights yj, j ∈ J ′, with
∑
j∈J ′ yj = 1 such that∑
j∈J ′
Aijyj ≥ α,
for all i ∈ I?
Theorem 25. Add-TPZSCG-DECISION is strongly NP-complete.
Proof. We first show that Add-TPZSCG-DECISION is in NP and then re-
duce VERTEX-COVER, which is known to be strongly NP-complete, to Add-
TPZSCG-DECISION. A polynomial-length guess for an instance of Add-
TPZSCG-DECISION consists of J ′ ⊂ J with |J ′| = b and probabilities
yj, j ∈ J ′. Such a guess verifies a yes-instance of Add-TPZSCG-DECISION if
the column player can guarantee a payoff of at least α by playing pure strategy
j with probability yj. To check this, we simply compare
∑
j∈J ′ Aijyj to α for
each i ∈ I. The number of steps required to do these comparisons is bounded
by O(|I||J |) so Add-TPZSCG-DECISION is in NP.
Next, we give a polynomial time reduction from VERTEX-COVER to
Add-TPZSCG-DECISION. For each e ∈ E, create a row e ∈ I in the payoff
matrix A and for each v ∈ V create a column v ∈ J . Let Aev = 1 if edge e ∈ E
is adjacent to v ∈ V and Aev = 0 otherwise. Finally let b = k and α = 1k .
Suppose that the instance of VERTEX-COVER is a yes-instance. Say
we invest in the premium strategies corresponding to the vertex cover V ′ (so
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for each e ∈ E since Aev must be 1 for at least one v ∈ V ′ since V ′ is a vertex
cover. Therefore the corresponding instance of Add-TPZSCG-DECISION is
also a yes-instance.
Conversely, if the instance of Add-TPZSCG-DECISION is a yes-instance
then there exists a subset J ′ ⊂ J such that at least one v ∈ J ′ is positive for
each e ∈ I (otherwise we would achieve a payoff of zero under row strategy
e ∈ I). Therefore V ′ = J ′ forms a cardinality k vertex cover of graph G and
the instance of VERTEX-COVER is also a yes-instance.
Since the above transformation can be done in polynomial time, Add-
TPZSCG-DECISION is strongly NP-complete.
We now define a decision version of Remove-TPZSCG and show that
it is also strongly NP-complete.
Remove-TPZSCG-DECISION:
INSTANCE: Payoff matrix Aij, i ∈ I, j ∈ J , positive integer b ≤ |J |,
and a real α.
QUESTION: Does there exist a subset J ′ ⊂ J of columns in A with
|J ′| = b and non-negative weights xi, i ∈ I with
∑




for all j ∈ J \ J ′?
Theorem 26. Remove-TPZSCG-DECISION is strongly NP-complete.
Proof. We show this again by a reduction from VERTEX-COVER. Confirming
that a guess consisting of a subset J ′ ⊂ J and probabilities xi, i ∈ I, verifies a
yes-instance of Remove-TPZSCG-DECISION involves comparing
∑
i∈I Aijxi
to α for each j ∈ J \ J ′, which can be done in O(|I||J |) time. Therefore
Remove-TPZSCG-DECISION is in NP.
We can reduce VERTEX-COVER to Remove-TPZSCG-DECISION as
follows. First, in the payoff matrix A create a row v ∈ I and column v ∈ J for
each vertex v ∈ V and a column e ∈ J for each edge e ∈ E. Let Ave = −1 if
edge e ∈ E is adjacent to v ∈ V and Ave = 0 otherwise. Also let Avv′ = −1 for
v = v′ and Avv′ = 0 otherwise. That is, −A will be the vertex-edge adjacency
matrix of G concatenated with an identity matrix. Finally let b = |V |− k and
α = − 1
k
.
If the instance of Remove-TPZSCG-DECISION is a yes-instance, then
we can find probabilities xi, i ∈ I, such that we achieve a payoff of at most
−1/k for each column strategy not in J ′. For columns v′ ∈ J \J ′ this amounts
to: ∑
v∈I






v∈I xv = 1, this inequality can only hold for k vertices, so the
|V | − k column strategies that we are allowed to remove must come from the
strategies corresponding to the vertices of G. Then xv = 1/k for all v ∈ J \J ′.
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With no more column strategies to remove, we must also guarantee a payoff











for all e ∈ J . This is only possible if Ave = −1 for at least one v ∈ J \ J ′,
which implies that J \ J ′ is a vertex cover with cardinality k. Therefore the
instance of VERTEX-COVER is also a yes-instance.
Suppose the instance of VERTEX-COVER is a yes-instance and let
V ′ ⊂ V be a cardinality-k vertex cover. If for each v ∈ V \ V ′ we remove
column strategy v ∈ J and for each v′ ∈ V ′ we play row strategy v′ ∈ I
with probability 1/k, then we achieve a payoff of at most −1/k for each of
the remaining column strategies. Since we did so by only removing |V | − k
column strategies, the instance of Remove-TPZSCG-DECISION must also be
a yes-instance.
This transformation can be done in polynomial time so Remove
-TPZSCG-DECISION is strongly NP-complete.
3.4 Transparent and Non-transparent Assets
3.4.1 Knapsack-Constrained Non-transparent Assets
The previous section assumes that all the detectors that the interdictor
deploys are non-transparent, that is, that the evader cannot determine where
they are. Suppose now that the interdictor has one type of asset which is non-
transparent as before but also has another type of asset which, when deployed,
105
is transparent (i.e., visible) to the evader. In our initial model, each checkpoint
can have none, one, or both types of assets. For this we propose a two-stage
model in which the interdictor deploys the transparent assets in the first stage
and the interdictor and smuggler play the previously described two-person
zero-sum Cournot game in the second stage.
Suppose checkpoint j does not receive a transparent asset. In this case,
if it receives a non-transparent asset the evasion probability for evader ω is
qωj ; otherwise the evasion probability is p
ω
j . If checkpoint j does receive a
transparent asset then the evasion probability for evader ω is rωj if no non-
transparent asset is present and sωj if a non-transparent asset is present. We














j . No ordering between r
ω
j
and qωj is assumed. To incorporate the transparent assets into the model, we
create two columns in the payoff matrix for each checkpoint j ∈ J and evader
ω ∈ Ω; a “premium” column which contains the pωj and qωj evasion probabilities
and a “free” column which contains the rωj and s
ω
j probabilities. Deploying a
transparent asset to a checkpoint simply prevents all evaders from using the
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premium column for that checkpoint. We can formulate this as follows:
Indices and Sets
i ∈ I indexes feasible deployments of the non-transparent assets
j ∈ J indexes checkpoints the evader can choose
ω ∈ Ω indexes evader scenarios
Data
c1j cost of installing a transparent asset at checkpoint j
c2j cost of installing a non-transparent asset at checkpoint j
b1 budget for installing transparent assets
b2 budget for installing non-transparent assets
pωj probability evader ω can traverse j undetected when neither type of
asset is present
qωj probability evader ω can traverse j undetected when there is no
transparent asset present but a non-transparent asset is present
Aωij game’s payoff if evader ω selects checkpoint j and the interdictor
selects deployment i with no transparent asset installed at j, i.e.,
Aωij = q
ω
j if deployment i places a non-transparent asset on










j ) ≤ b2, i ∈ I
rωj probability evader ω can traverse j undetected when there is a
transparent asset present but no non-transparent asset is present
sωj probability evader ω can traverse j undetected when both types of
assets are present
Bωij game’s payoff if evader ω selects checkpoint j and the interdictor
selects deployment i with a transparent asset installed at j, i.e.,
Bωij = s
ω
j if deployment i places a non-transparent asset on










j ) ≤ b2, i ∈ I
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Interdictor’s Decision Variables
tj indicates if the interdictor installs a transparent asset at checkpoint
j
xi probability that the interdictor chooses deployment plan i for
installing non-transparent assets
Evader’s Decision Variables
yωj probability that evader ω chooses checkpoint j when there is no
transparent asset present






































j ) = 1 : θ
ω, ω ∈ Ω (3.27c)
0 ≤ xi, i ∈ I (3.27d)
0 ≤ yωj ≤ 1− tj, j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω (3.27e)
0 ≤ zωj , j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω. (3.27f)
Fixing y and z and taking the dual of the inner linear program with respect
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j ) = 1, ω ∈ Ω (3.28c)
0 ≤ yωj ≤ 1− tj : πωj (t), j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω (3.28d)
0 ≤ zωj , j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω. (3.28e)
If tj = 0 for some j, an evader would prefer to use the y
ω
j decision variable
over zωj since the associated evasion probabilities are larger. If tj = 1 for some
j, an evader wishing to traverse checkpoint j is forced to use the zωj decision
variable due to (3.28d). Unfortunately the optimal value of this optimization
problem is a concave function of t since t appears on the right-hand side of the
constraints. This does not make h amenable to minimization. We reformulate
(3.28) with the goal of effectively moving t into the objective function. To
do so, we find values π̄ωj such that π̄
ω
j ≥ πωj (t), that is, we find upper bounds
on the optimal dual variables of (3.28d). Then, applying Proposition 4 and
following the same procedure we used to reformulate model (1.13) as model
(1.20), we assess a penalty π̄ωj if tj = 1 and y
ω
j > 0 and relax the upper bounds
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j ) = 1 : θ
ω, ω ∈ Ω (3.29c)
0 ≤ yωj , j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω (3.29d)
0 ≤ zωj , j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω. (3.29e)
By Proposition 4, it can be shown that h(t) = h̄(t) for all t ∈ T but h̄ is convex
over the convex hull of T while h is concave over the convex hull of T . To make
our model amenable to decomposition, we use h̄ instead of h. If we let L index

















j tj, l ∈ L (3.30b)
t ∈ T. (3.30c)
To generate constraints (3.30b), we first solve a relaxation of (3.30) with a
subset of the possible constraints in (3.30b) to obtain a feasible t, then sub-
stitute that t into model (3.29) and solve to generate a new extreme point (ŷ,
ẑ, λ̂). We then add the constraint associated with that extreme point and
repeat. Optimal solutions to the relaxations of (3.30) give us lower bounds
on the optimal value of (3.26), and optimal solutions to (3.29) for some fixed
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t ∈ T give upper bounds. If these bounds are within ε of each other we may
terminate with an ε-optimal solution.
When we solve (3.29) for a fixed value of t, we generate the constraints
in (3.29b) on an as-needed basis by solving a relaxation with a small subset of
constraints to generate (ŷ, ẑ, λ̂) and then solving a separation problem of the
form (3.7). The solution to the separation problem either identifies a violated
constraint in (3.29b) or proves that all constraints are satisfied by the current
(ŷ, ẑ, λ̂).
3.4.2 Cardinality-Constrained Non-transparent Assets
If c2j = 1 for all j ∈ J , then we can compute the optimal value of
the second-stage problem by solving a polynomially-sized LP as shown in
Section 3.2.4. This allows us to formulate the two-stage model as a single















j , j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω (3.31c)∑
i∈I
xi = 1 : λ (3.31d)
0 ≤ xi, i ∈ I. (3.31e)
If we let D be the strategy-checkpoint incidence matrix as defined in Sec-
tion 3.2.4, then we can express our payoff matrices as Aωij = p
ω
j − (qωj − pωj )Dij
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and Bωij = r
ω
j − (sωj − rωj )Dij. Defining x̂j =
∑
i∈I Dijxi as the probability that






s.t. θω ≥ pω(pωj − (qωj + pωj )x̂j)− π̄ωj tj, j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω(3.32b)




0 ≤ x̂j ≤ 1, j ∈ J. (3.32e)
Dividing pω out of θω so that θω now represents the conditional evasion prob-
ability of smuggler ω and suppressing any “bar” or “hat” notation, we can






s.t. θω ≥ pωj + (qωj − pωj )xj − πωj tj, j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω (3.33b)
θω ≥ rωj + (sωj − rωj )xj, j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω (3.33c)∑
j∈J




tj ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ J (3.33f)
0 ≤ xj ≤ 1, j ∈ J. (3.33g)
We must choose πωj to be sufficiently large such that we are guaranteed that
constraint (3.33b) is not binding for any j with tj = 1. One possibility is to let
πωj = p
ω
j , but this can lead to a loose LP relaxation value. In the next section
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we discuss a reformulation which both tightens the LP relaxation value and
obviates the need for tight bounds for the parameter πωj .
3.4.3 Reformulation for p = q
We now consider a reformulation of model (3.33) which can significantly
tighten its LP relaxation. We first consider the simplified case in which the
non-transparent asset does not decrease the evasion probability at a checkpoint
unless a transparent asset is also installed at that checkpoint. This situation
could arise, for example, if the transparent asset is a detector and the non-
transparent asset is an upgrade to that detector. In this case we have pωj = q
ω
j
for all j ∈ J and ω ∈ Ω and constraint (3.33b) becomes:
θω ≥ pωj (1− tj), j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω, (3.34)
if we choose πωj = p
ω
j . We can now state the following result regarding the
convex hull of the polyhedron induced by constraints (3.34) and (3.33c) for a
particular ω ∈ Ω.
Proposition 27. Let Θω = {(t, x, θω) : θω ≥ pωj (1− tj), j ∈ J, θω ≥ rωj + (sωj −
rωj )xj, j ∈ J, t ∈ Z
|J |
+ , x ∈ R
|J |
+ , θ
ω ∈ R+} where 0 ≤ sωj ≤ rωj ≤ pωj ≤ 1 and let
(t̂, x̂, θ̂ω) be an extreme point of the convex hull of Θω. Then
(i) θ̂ω must equal either pωj or r
ω
j for some j ∈ J or 0;
(ii) t̂j = 1 if p
ω
j > θ̂






Proof. Suppose that (t̂, x̂, θ̂ω) is an extreme point of the convex hull of Θω.
Then






j − rωj )x̂j, 0).
If θ̂ω > θmin then the points (t̂, x̂, θ̂
ω + ε) and (t̂, x̂, θ̂ω − ε) where ε = θ̂ω − θmin
are both in Θω, contradicting the assumption that (t̂, x̂, θ̂ω) is an extreme
point. Therefore θ̂ω = θmin. Now maxj∈J p
ω
j (1− t̂j) can only equal pωj for some
j ∈ J or 0 since pωj ≤ 1 and t̂j must be integer. To prove (i) it only remains
to show that if θ̂ω 6= pωj for all j ∈ J and θ̂ω 6= 0, then θ̂ω = rωj for some
j ∈ J . Suppose not. Then there exists a non-empty subset J ′ ⊆ J such that
θ̂ω = rωj + (s
ω
j − rωj )x̂j > 0 and x̂j > 0 for all j ∈ J ′. Let ε = min(ε1, ε2)
where ε1 = θ̂
ω − max(maxj∈J pωj (1 − t̂j),maxj∈J\J ′ rωj + (sωj − rωj )x̂j, 0) and
ε2 = minj∈J ′(r
ω





, where ej is the unit vector
with the jth component equal to 1, then the points (t̂, x̂ + εeJ ′ , θ̂
ω − ε) and
(t̂, x̂− εeJ ′ , θ̂ω + ε) are both in Θω. This proves (i).
To prove (ii), note that we must have t̂j ≥ 1 for all j such that pωj > θ̂ω
and t̂j ≥ 0 otherwise. Suppose that for some j′, either t̂j′ ≥ 2 and pωj′ > θ̂ω or
t̂j′ ≥ 1 and pωj′ ≤ θ̂ω. Then (t̂ + ej′ , x̂, θ̂ω) and (t̂ − ej′ , x̂, θ̂ω) are both in Θω
giving a contradiction. Therefore t̂j = 1 for all j such that p
ω
j > θ̂
ω and t̂j = 0
otherwise. Similarly to prove (iii), note that x̂j ≥
(θ̂ω−rωj )+
sωj −rωj
for all j ∈ J and
suppose that this inequality is strict for some j′ ∈ J . Then (t̂, x̂+ εej′ , θ̂ω) and








, are both in Θω and (t̂, x̂, θ̂ω) is not
an extreme point of the convex hull of Θω.
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The significance of Proposition 27 is that at an extreme point of the convex
hull of Θω, θω can only take on at most 2|J |+ 1 distinct values at an extreme
point and, given a value of θω, both t and x take on unique values. Thus, the
convex hull of Θω has at most 2|J | + 1 extreme points. This, coupled with
the fact that the extreme directions are (ej, 0, 0), j ∈ J , (0, ej, 0), j ∈ J , and
(0, 0, 1), means that we can form a polynomially-sized representation of the
convex hull of Θω. Specifically, if we append a “dummy” checkpoint j0 to J
with pωj0 = 0 and let auxiliary variables u
ω
j correspond to the extreme point at
which θω = pωj and v
ω
j correspond to the extreme point at which θ
ω = rωj , we







































j ) = 1, ω ∈ Ω (3.35d)
0 ≤ uωj ≤ 1, j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω (3.35e)
0 ≤ vωj ≤ 1, j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω. (3.35f)
The auxiliary variables uωj and v
ω
j choose a target evasion probability and con-
straints (3.35b) and (3.35c) require that the appropriate resources be deployed
to meet that target. More specifically, (3.35b) requires that a transparent as-
set be deployed at checkpoint j if the target evasion probability is lower than
pωj , and (3.35c) requires that the probability that a non-transparent asset is
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deployed at checkpoint j be sufficiently large if the target evasion probability
is lower than rωj . Finally, constraint (3.35a) chooses the appropriate evasion
probability and (3.35d)-(3.35f) are standard convexity constraints. Taking
into account the fact that constraint (3.35a) is tight at an optimal solution
when we minimize a positively weighted sum of θω, we arrive at the following



















3.4.4 Reformulation for p 6= q
We now present a polyhedral analysis and the resulting reformulation
for (3.33) when p 6= q. First, we present a result regarding the convex hull
of the polyhedron induced by constraints (3.33b) and (3.33c) for a particular
ω ∈ Ω.
Proposition 28. Let Θω = {(t, x, θω) : θω ≥ pωj (1 − tj) + (qωj − pωj )xj, j ∈
J, θω ≥ rωj + (sωj − rωj )xj, j ∈ J, t ∈ Z
|J |
+ , x ∈ R
|J |
+ , θ
ω ∈ R+}, where
0 ≤ sωj ≤ rωj ≤ pωj ≤ 1 and qωj ≤ pωj , and let (t̂, x̂, θ̂ω) be an extreme point of
the convex hull of Θω. Then
(i) θ̂ω must equal either pωj or r
ω
j for some j ∈ J or 0, and
(ii) for all j ∈ J , either t̂j = 1 and x̂j =
(rωj −θ̂ω)+
rωj −sωj













j − rωj )x̂j, 0).
But maxj∈J p
ω
j (1− t̂j) + (qωj − pωj )x̂j is either no bigger than 0 or equals pωj′ for
some j′ ∈ J . Suppose not. Then there exists a non-empty set J ′ = {j ∈ J :
t̂j = 0, θ̂
ω = pωj + (q
ω
j − pωj )x̂j, x̂j > 0}. Then the points (t̂, x̂ + εeJ ′ , θ̂ω − ε)





and ε is sufficiently small, are




j − rωj )x̂j is either no bigger than
0 or will equal rωj′ for some j ∈ J . This proves (i).
To prove (ii), we first note that if t̂j ≥ 2 for any j ∈ J , then the points
(t̂+ej, x̂, θ̂
ω) and (t̂−ej, x̂, θ̂ω) are both in Θω. Thus, for each j ∈ J , it suffices




if t̂j = 0, then x̂j ≥
(pωj −θ̂ω)+
pωj −qωj
. In either case, if the inequality on x̂j is strict
then the points (t̂, x̂+ εej, θ̂
ω) and (t̂, x̂− εej, θ̂ω) are both in Θω and (t̂, x̂, θ̂ω)
cannot be an extreme point of the convex hull of Θω. So the inequality on x̂j
must hold with equality which proves (ii).
We can still write down a polynomially-sized representation of the con-
vex hull of Θω even though the set now has exponentially many extreme points.
In addition to uωj and v
ω
j which have the same interpretation as before, we in-
troduce auxiliary variables αωjj′ and β
ω





1 if uωj′ = 1 (v
ω
j′ = 1) and tj′ = 0. We can view these new variables as selecting
from amongst the two cases referred to in part (ii) of Proposition 28. Then
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, j ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω(3.37d)
αωjj′ ≤ uωj′ , j ∈ J, j′ ∈ J, ω ∈ Ω (3.37e)




j ) = 1, ω ∈ Ω (3.37g)
α, β, u, v ≥ 0. (3.37h)





















Thus far, we have restricted our attention to network interdiction prob-
lems in which an interdictor installs radiation detectors at border crossings
of a single country with the goal of minimizing the evasion probability of a
smuggler. If the interdictor and smuggler agree on the values of the evasion
probabilities and the smuggler is aware of the detector locations, then the
problem can be solved in polynomial time if the smuggler’s origin-destination
pair is known ahead of time but is NP-complete if the origin-destination pair
is known only via a probability distribution. Thus, while the stochastic ver-
sion of the problem is hard to solve, we can easily compute a lower bound on
the smuggler’s evasion probability conditional on his origin-destination pair.
If we solve a mixed-integer programming formulation of the problem via a
branch-and-bound algorithm, such a lower bound can significantly tighten the
LP relaxation and decrease the overall solution time.
In the one-country problem, the country in question could be either the
country in which the nuclear material originates or the country to which it is
being smuggled. A natural extension to this problem is to allow the installation
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of detectors at border crossings of both the origin and destination countries. In
Section 4.2 we show that this two-country model also has the property that it
is solvable in polynomial time given the smuggler’s origin-destination pair but
is NP-complete if the origin-destination pair is stochastic. In Section 4.3, we
formulate the stochastic version of the two-country model and present solution
techniques which perform well in practice. In Section 4.4 we show that the
three-country model is NP-complete even in the deterministic case, and that
the two-country stochastic model remains NP-complete even when the budget
constraint is dualized.
4.2 Two-Country Deterministic Network Interdiction
Problem
4.2.1 Formulation
We first show that the deterministic version of the two-country problem
can be solved in polynomial time by solving a series of vertex cover problems
on a bipartite network. We are given a transportation network with node
set N and arc set A, an origin o ∈ N , and a destination d ∈ N . For each
arc a ∈ A, the probability that the smuggler can traverse the arc undetected
is pa if there is no detector installed on the arc and qa otherwise. We let
i ∈ I index all arcs corresponding to outbound border crossings for the origin
country, j ∈ J index all arcs corresponding to inbound border crossings for
the destination country, and assume that every o-d path includes exactly one
arc in I and one arc in J and that only arcs in I and J can receive detectors.
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Since the smuggler encounters no detectors along any path from o to the tail of
an arc i ∈ I, we can precompute the maximum probability that the smuggler
can reach checkpoint i ∈ I undetected by solving a maximum-reliability path
problem. By the same reasoning, we can precompute the maximum probability
that the smuggler can travel undetected from the head of an arc i ∈ I to the
tail of an arc j ∈ J and from the head of an arc j ∈ J to the destination
d. We define parameter γk as the product of these three probabilities where
k ∈ K indexes all possible (i, j) pairs. Figure 4.1 shows the network topology
after preprocessing for the stochastic version of this problem considered in
Section 4.3. The topology of the deterministic version differs only in that it
includes a single origin-destination pair.
Figure 4.1: Topology of the preprocessed network for the two-country stochas-
tic network interdiction problem. Only border crossing arcs can receive detec-
tors.
In what follows, we refer to the elements k ∈ K as paths since, assuming
that the aforementioned maximum-reliability paths are unique and that the
smuggler has perfect information, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
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the elements of K and the paths the smuggler would potentially traverse. If
i(k) ∈ I and j(k) ∈ J are the checkpoint arcs traversed by path k, then the
probability the smuggler can traverse path k undetected is the product of γk
and one of pi(k)pj(k), pi(k)qj(k), qi(k)pj(k), and qi(k)qj(k). We can formulate the
two-country deterministic network interdiction problem as follows.
Indices and sets:
I set of outbound border checkpoints for the origin country
J set of inbound border checkpoints for the destination country,
I ∩ J = ∅
K = I × J set of paths the smuggler may traverse
i(k), j(k) checkpoint arcs traversed by path k
Data:
b total budget for installing detectors
ci, cj cost of installing detector at border checkpoint i, j
γk probability smuggler can traverse paths from o to tail of i(k),
from the head of i(k) to tail of j(k), and from the head of j(k)
to d undetected
pi, pj probability smuggler can traverse checkpoint i, j undetected
with no detector installed
qi, qj probability smuggler can traverse checkpoint i, j undetected
with a detector installed; qi < pi and qj < pj
Decision variables:
xi, xj 1 if a detector is installed at checkpoint i, j and 0 otherwise






s.t. x ∈ X (4.1b)
θ ≥ γkpi(k)pj(k)(1− xi(k) − xj(k)), k ∈ K (4.1c)
θ ≥ γkqi(k)pj(k)(1− xj(k)), k ∈ K (4.1d)
θ ≥ γkpi(k)qj(k)(1− xi(k)), k ∈ K (4.1e)
θ ≥ γkqi(k)qj(k), k ∈ K, (4.1f)




j∈J cjxj ≤ b}. Constraint (4.1c) states
that if neither checkpoint along a path k is interdicted, then the smuggler
achieves an evasion probability of at least γkpi(k)pj(k). Constraints (4.1d) and
(4.1e) handle the case in which one checkpoint along path k is interdicted and
the other is not, and (4.1f) handles the case in which both checkpoints along
path k are interdicted.
4.2.2 Simplifying the Model
Model (4.1) is a mixed-integer linear program and could be solved using
a standard branch-and-bound solver. We do not recommend this, and instead
outline a procedure for solving (4.1) in polynomial time. Before doing so, we
describe some ways to reduce the size of the model and simplify notation.
This is also useful for our subsequent discussion of the stochastic variant of
the model. First, constraint (4.1f) is nothing more than a simple lower bound
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We can also reduce the number of constraints in (4.1d) and (4.1e). If
we define Kj = {k ∈ K : j(k) = j}, then we can rewrite (4.1d) as follows
θ ≥ γkqi(k)pj(1− xj), j ∈ J, k ∈ Kj. (4.3)
For a fixed j ∈ J , these constraints are identical apart from the γkqi(k)pj
coefficient on the right-hand side. So, for each j ∈ J , we only need to include
the constraint with the largest coefficient and therefore (4.1d) is dominated by
θ ≥ max
k∈Kj
γkqi(k)pj(1− xj), j ∈ J. (4.4)
Similarly, if we define Ki = {k ∈ K : i(k) = i}, then (4.1e) is dominated by
θ ≥ max
k∈Ki
γkpiqj(k)(1− xi), i ∈ I. (4.5)
Replacing (4.1d) and (4.1e) with (4.4) and (4.5) reduces the size of the model
by replacing 2|I||J | constraints with |I|+ |J | constraints.
Now, we can write model (4.1) with a single set of constraints linking θ
to x by noting that both (4.4) and (4.5) are special cases of (4.1c) with either
xi(k) or xj(k) fixed to 0. To handle these special cases, we append “dummy”
checkpoints i0 and j0 to sets I and J , respectively, and create new decision
variables xi0 and xj0 which are both fixed to 0. For each i ∈ I, we create a path
k(i) with i(k(i)) = i and j(k(i)) = j0. We similarly create a path k(j) for each
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j ∈ J . Also, we define an augmented set of paths K̄ = K∪i∈I{k(i)}∪j∈J{k(j)}
and a parameter (rk)k∈K̄ as follows:
rk =

γkpi(k)pj(k) k ∈ K
maxk′∈Ki γk′piqj(k′) k = k(i), i ∈ I
maxk′∈Kj γk′qi(k′)pj k = k(j), j ∈ J.
(4.6)
Then the constraint
θ ≥ rk(1− xi(k) − xj(k)), k ∈ K̄, (4.7)
includes constraint (4.1c) as well as both constraints (4.4) and (4.5). Finally,
we use simple lower bound on θ, θ ≡ maxk∈K γkqi(k)qj(k), to tighten the coeffi-




s.t. x ∈ X (4.8b)
θ ≥ rk − (rk − θ)+(xi(k) + xj(k)), k ∈ K̄ (4.8c)
θ ≥ θ, (4.8d)




j∈J cjxj ≤ b, xi0 = xj0 =
0}.
4.2.3 Solution Techniques
In this section, we prove that (4.8) can be solved in polynomial time.
This is a direct result of the fact that the optimal value of (4.8) can only take
on a modest number of values, coupled with the fact that, for any fixed θ̂, we
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can efficiently assess the feasibility of (4.8) with the added constraint θ ≤ θ̂
by solving a vertex cover problem on a bipartite graph. We also propose a
bisection search procedure for solving (4.8) which uses this feasibility test as
a subroutine.
Theorem 29. Model (4.8) can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. At an optimal solution (x∗, θ∗) to (4.8), either θ∗ = θ or at least one
constraint in (4.8c) is tight. Since the components of x∗ are binary, it must
hold that either θ∗ = rk for some k ∈ K̄ or θ∗ = θ. Since θ∗ can take on at
most |I||J |+ |I|+ |J |+ 1 values, we can solve (4.8) in polynomial time if, for
a fixed target evasion probability θ̂ ≥ θ, we can either find a feasible solution
(x̂, θ̂) to (4.8) or show that (4.8) with the added constraint θ ≤ θ̂ is infeasible.
Equivalently, we must either find an x ∈ X satisfying
xi(k) + xj(k) ≥ 1 ∀k ∈ K̄ : rk > θ̂. (4.9)
or prove that no such x ∈ X exists. This equivalence is due to the fact that if
xi(k) +xj(k) = 0 for any k ∈ K̄ with rk > θ̂, then we have θ ≥ rk > θ̂ by (4.8c).
In the (weighted) vertex cover problem we are given an undirected
graph G(V,E), weights wv, v ∈ V , and a positive real α, and must determine
whether there exists a subset V ′ ⊆ V with
∑
v∈V ′ cv ≤ α such that for every
edge (i, j) ∈ E at least one of i and j belongs to V ′. We can formulate a vertex
cover problem that finds an x ∈ X satisfying (4.9) if it exists as follows. We
create a vertex vi ∈ V with weight ci for every i ∈ I and a vertex vj ∈ V with
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weight cj for every j ∈ J . Then for every k ∈ K̄ such that rk > θ̂, we create
an edge ek ∈ E such that ek = (vi(k), vj(k)) if i(k) 6= i0 and j(k) 6= j0. If for
some such k we have i(k) = i0, then to satisfy (4.9) we must choose xj(k) = 1.
In this case, we delete the vertex vj(k) from V and all edges adjacent to the
deleted vertex from E. Similarly, if j(k) = j0 for ek ∈ E then we must have
xi(k) = 1 and we delete vertex vi(k) and all adjacent edges. Deleting a vertex
is equivalent to forcing interdiction of the corresponding checkpoint. Finally,
we let α be the difference between the budget b and the sum of the weights of
the vertices that were deleted. If α < 0 then model (4.8) with the additional
constraint θ ≤ θ̂ is infeasible. Otherwise, we determine feasibility by solving
the vertex cover problem. Since every e ∈ E can be written as e = (vi, vj)
where i ∈ I and j ∈ J , the graph we have defined is bipartite. If ci = cj = 1
for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J , by König’s theorem the vertex cover problem can be
solved in polynomial time by solving the associated maximum cardinality edge
matching problem. For general interdiction costs, we can solve the vertex cover
problem by finding a minimum cut on a directed graph G′ defined identically
to G aside from the following modifications. Add a source vertex s and a sink
vertex t. For all i ∈ I add a directed edge (s, vi) with capacity ci, and for all
j ∈ J add a directed edge (vj, t) with capacity cj. Let every e = (vi, vj) ∈ E
be directed from vi to vj and have infinite capacity. Every finite-capacity s-t
cut in G′ corresponds to a feasible vertex cover of G with total weight equal to
the value of the cut, and vice versa [1]. Thus, we can solve (4.8) in polynomial
time.
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Several computational enhancements we develop for the stochastic variant of
(4.8) use the construction and solution of the bipartite vertex cover problem
described in Theorem 29 as a subroutine. To facilitate the development of both
those computational enhancements and a bisection search for solving (4.8), we
include the following pseudo-code description.
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Algorithm 2: CanCoverPaths(S, c, b)
Input: Subset of paths S ⊆ K̄, installation costs ci, cj, interdiction budget
b
Output: Return true if there exists x ∈ X satisfying xi(k)+xj(k) ≥ 1 ∀k ∈ S,
return false otherwise
For every i ∈ I (j ∈ J) add vertex vi (vj) with weight ci (cj) to V
E ← ∅
for all k ∈ S do
if i(k) = i0 then
V ← V \ {j(k)}
b← b− cj(k)
end if
if j(k) = j0 then




for all k ∈ S do
if i(k) 6= i0 and j(k) 6= j0 and i(k) ∈ V and j(k) ∈ V then
E ← (vi(k), vj(k))
end if
end for
if b < 0 then
return false
end if





We conclude this section by describing a simple bisection search pro-
cedure for solving instances of (4.8). First, let K+ = {k ∈ K̄ : rk > θ} and
index the paths k ∈ K+, k1, . . . , k|K+|, such that rk1 ≥ rk2 ≥ · · · ≥ rk|K+| . Let
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i = 1 and ī = |K+|. Then, repeat the following until i = ī. For θ̂ = rki where
i = d(i+ ī)/2e, determine if there exists x ∈ X that satisfies (4.9) by running
Algorithm 2 with S = {k1, . . . , ki−1}. If so, then θ∗ ≤ rki and let i = i. If
not, then θ∗ > rki and let ī = i − 1. If i = ī and i 6= |K+|, then θ∗ = rki .
If i = ī = |K+| determine if there exists x ∈ X satisfying (4.9) for θ̂ = θ by
running Algorithm 2 with S = K+. If so, then θ∗ = θ. Otherwise θ∗ = rk|K+| .
4.3 Two-Country Stochastic Network Interdiction Prob-
lem
In this section we consider a stochastic variant of the two-country net-
work interdiction problem in which the arc evasion probabilities and the smug-
gler’s origin-destination pair are random. We are given a finite number of
smuggler scenarios ω ∈ Ω, each of which is realized with a known probability
pω. Each scenario specifies an origin-destination pair (oω, dω) and arc eva-
sion probabilities pωa and q
ω
a , which are defined in the same manner as their
deterministic counterparts. As such, we define parameters γωk and r
ω
k which
are scenario dependent but are otherwise defined identically to γk and rk, re-
spectively. If we let decision variable θω be the smuggler’s evasion probability
conditional on the realization of scenario ω and seek to minimize the uncon-








s.t. x ∈ X (4.10b)
θω ≥ rωk − (rωk − θω)+(xi(k) + xj(k)), k ∈ K̄, ω ∈ Ω (4.10c)
θω ≥ θω, ω ∈ Ω, (4.10d)








Alternatively, for each ω ∈ Ω in turn, we can let θω be the minimum of θω
subject to constraints (4.10b)-(4.10d) defined only over the current ω. We can
compute these lower bounds in polynomial time by solving a single scenario
problem in the form of (4.8) for each ω ∈ Ω. Doing so is equivalent to solving
the wait-and-see problem associated with model (4.10). That is, we are com-
puting the minimum evasion probability for each smuggler as if we know the
smuggler’s identity before installing the detectors. For larger instances, espe-
cially those with a small budget relative to the number of checkpoints, the
computational effort spent computing tighter values of θω is more than made
up for by decreased computational effort when running a branch-and-bound
algorithm to solve model (4.10).
Preliminary computational experiments revealed two main obstacles to
effectively solving (4.10). First, since the number of paths can grow quadrat-
ically in the number of checkpoints, the size of constraint set (4.10c) can be
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large even for modest instances. Tighter lower bounds θω on the conditional
evasion probabilities help to address this issue since constraint (4.10c) can be
removed for any k ∈ K̄ and ω ∈ Ω such that rωk ≤ θ
ω. In Section 4.3.1, we
show that by solving a sequence of bipartite vertex cover problems we can
identify additional constraints in (4.10c) that cannot be binding. Doing so is
especially worthwhile when solving instances with larger budget values. Sec-
ond, the LP relaxation of (4.10) typically produces very weak lower bounds.
In Section 4.3.2 we describe a stronger reformulation of (4.10) which is similar
to the reformulation of BiSNIP from Section 2.5. Additionally, we recognize
that the bounds obtained by solving the wait-and-see problem are typically
loose since we do not actually know the smuggler’s identity ahead of time.
In Section 4.3.3 we describe a customized branching scheme which helps to
alleviate this problem.
4.3.1 Identifying Additional Non-binding Constraints
Recall that constraint (4.10c) need not be generated for any k ∈ K̄
and ω ∈ Ω satisfying rωk ≤ θ
ω, where θω is any valid lower bound on θω. This
occurs when, for example, we have insufficient budget to interdict at least one
checkpoint along every path that gives smuggler ω a higher evasion probability
than that of path k. In this case, smuggler ω never traverses path k and the
corresponding constraint in (4.10c) cannot be binding. The same holds true
if it is impossible to force smuggler ω to traverse path k without interdicting
one of the checkpoints used by path k. We state this formally as follows.
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Proposition 30. For a particular k′ ∈ K̄ and ω′ ∈ Ω, constraint (4.10c)
cannot be binding in a feasible solution to (4.10) unless there exists x ∈ X
satisfying






xi(k′) = xj(k′) = 0. (4.12)
Proof. Consider constraint (4.10c) for a fixed k′ ∈ K̄ and ω′ ∈ Ω. If (4.11) does
not hold, then there exists k′′ ∈ K̄ with rω′k′′ > rω
′
k′ such that xi(k′′) + xj(k′′) = 0.
Then θω
′ ≥ rω′k′′ > rω
′
k′ and the constraint cannot be binding. If (4.12) does not




′ ≥ θω′ .
We can run Algorithm 2 with S = {k ∈ K̄ : rω′k > rω
′
k′ } to determine whether
there exists x ∈ X satisfying (4.11). To determine whether there exists x ∈ X
satisfying both (4.11) and (4.12), we treat checkpoints i(k′) and j(k′) as non-
interdictable checkpoints, i.e., for any path in S which traverses i(k′) or j(k′),
replace i(k′) with i0 and j(k
′) with j0, and run Algorithm 2 using the modified
set S as input. We repeat this for all k′ ∈ K̄ and ω′ ∈ Ω with rω′k′ > θ
ω′ and




We now consider a reformulation of (4.10) which has a tighter LP relax-
ation. This reformulation is analogous to that for BiSNIP, which we described
in Chapter 2. To make the connection between (4.10) and BiSNIP, we define a
new decision variable vk, k ∈ K̄, which can equal 1 if either checkpoint along
path k is interdicted and must equal 0 otherwise. That is, we have
vk ≤ xi(k) + xj(k), k ∈ K̄
0 ≤ vk ≤ 1, k ∈ K̄,
and constraint (4.10c) can be written as
θω ≥ rωk − (rωk − θω)+vk, k ∈ K̄, ω ∈ Ω.
Consider the mixed-integer set Θω = {(v, θω) : θω ≥ rωk − (rωk − θ
ω)+vk, k ∈
K̄, θω ≥ θω, v ∈ Z|K̄|+ }. We know from the analysis of an equivalent set in
Section 2.5 that the convex hull of Θω has at most |K̄|+ 1 extreme points and
|K̄| + 1 extreme directions. We also know how to construct a polynomially-
sized description of this convex hull. We apply the same analysis to (4.10)
as follows. Let k(l, ω) ∈ K̄ be an index mapping of the paths satisfying
rωk(1,ω) ≥ rωk(2,ω) ≥ · · · ≥ rωk(|K̄|,ω) and ∪
|K̄|
l=1{k(l, ω)} = K̄ for all ω ∈ Ω. Also
define auxiliary variables uωk which equal 1 if smuggler ω is forced to traverse
a path with an evasion probability lower than that of path k and equal 0













k(l−1,ω) − uωk(l,ω)), ω ∈ Ω (4.14c)
xi(k) + xj(k) ≥ uωk , k ∈ K̄, ω ∈ Ω (4.14d)
uωk(l−1,ω) ≥ uωk(l,ω), l = 2, . . . , |K̄|, ω ∈ Ω (4.14e)
0 ≤ uωk ≤ I(rωk > θω), k ∈ K̄, ω ∈ Ω (4.14f)
θω ≥ θω, ω ∈ Ω, (4.14g)
where uωk(0,ω) ≡ 1 and vk is replaced by xi(k) + xj(k) in constraint (4.14d). A
shortcoming of (4.14) is that it contains |K̄||Ω| variables not present in (4.10),
which only has |I| + |J | + |Ω| variables. Our computational experience has
shown that the LP relaxation of (4.14) can be considerably more challenging
to solve than that of (4.10). We attribute this to the fact that even an instance
of (4.14) with a modest number of checkpoints and scenarios can have a large
number of variables since the number of paths is quadratic in the number of
checkpoints. On the other hand, the number of variables in (4.10) is linear
in the number of checkpoints and the number of scenarios. For large-scale
instances, we were unable to solve the LP relaxation of (4.14) in a reasonable
amount of time. For the corresponding instances of (4.10), the LP relaxation
solved quickly but produced lower bounds too weak to prove optimality.
We obtain a formulation with a tighter LP relaxation than (4.10) but
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with fewer variables than (4.14) by including fewer constraints in the defini-
tions of the sets Θω. Specifically, we define Θω = {(v, θω) : θω ≥ rωk − (rωk −
θω)+vk, k ∈ Kω, θω ≥ θω, v ∈ Z|K̄|+ } where Kω ⊆ K̄, ω ∈ Ω. Let k′(l, ω) ∈ Kω
be an index mapping of the paths satisfying rωk′(1,ω) ≥ rωk′(2,ω) ≥ · · · ≥ rωk′(|Kω |,ω)
and ∪|K
ω |







s.t. x ∈ X (4.15b)






k′(l−1,ω) − uωk′(l,ω)), ω ∈ Ω (4.15d)
xi(k) + xj(k) ≥ uωk , k ∈ Kω, ω ∈ Ω (4.15e)
uωk′(l−1,ω) ≥ uωk′(l,ω), l = 2, . . . , |Kω|, ω ∈ Ω (4.15f)
0 ≤ uωk ≤ I(rωk > θω), k ∈ Kω, ω ∈ Ω (4.15g)
θω ≥ θω, ω ∈ Ω, (4.15h)
where uωk′(0,ω) ≡ 1. For each ω ∈ Ω, constraint (4.10c) for paths k ∈ Kω
are included in the definition of Θω and are enforced by constraints (4.15d) -
(4.15g), which describe the convex hull of Θω. For paths k ∈ K̄\Kω constraint
(4.10c) remains in its original form as (4.15c).
We determine which paths to include in each Kω based on the following
observation. Let (x̂, û, θ̂) be an optimal solution to the LP relaxation of (4.14),
and let v̂k = min(x̂i(k) + x̂j(k), 1) for all k ∈ K̄. By induction on constraints
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(4.14d) and (4.14e), we have that
ûωk(l,ω) ≤ min
1≤l′≤l
v̂k(l′,ω), l = 1, . . . , |K̄|, ω ∈ Ω. (4.16)
Since increasing a component of u can only decrease the objective value, we
assume (4.16) holds with equality. If v̂k(l,ω) ≥ min1≤l′≤l−1 v̂k(l′,ω) for some l and
ω, then ûωk(l,ω) = û
ω
k(l−1,ω), and constraint (4.14c) is equivalent to (4.15d) with
Kω = K̄ \{k(l, ω)}. This implies that the inclusion of k(l, ω) in Kω would not
strengthen the LP relaxation of (4.15), and suggests the following routine for
populating Kω, ω ∈ Ω. Solve the LP relaxation of model (4.15) with Kω = ∅,
ω ∈ Ω, and let (x̂, û, θ̂) be the optimal solution. Compute v̂, and for every
ω ∈ Ω and l = 1, . . . , |K̄|, add k(l, ω) to Kω only if v̂k(l,ω) < min1≤l′≤l−1 v̂k(l′,ω).
Resolve (4.15) and augment Kω until v̂k(l,ω) ≥ min1≤l′≤l−1 v̂k(l′,ω) for all ω ∈ Ω
and k(l, ω) ∈ K̄ \ Kω or until some other termination criteria is met. In
practice, this results in only a modest number of paths being included in
each Kω, and so (4.15) typically solves faster than either (4.10) or (4.14) for
challenging instances.
4.3.3 Branching
We note from our computational experience that instances of (4.10) typ-
ically become more challenging to solve as the budget for installing detectors
increases. With unit interdiction costs, some of the most challenging instances
are those with a budget, b, greater than half the checkpoints,|I| + |J |, which
is counterintuitive since the number of feasible solutions, |X|, decreases when
the budget exceeds that threshold. We reconcile this apparent inconsistency
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with the fact that the lower bounds θω obtained by solving the wait-and-see
problem decrease as the budget increases. Since we calculate θω by assum-
ing that we dedicate all of our detectors to minimizing smuggler ω’s evasion
probability, these bounds become particularly weak for instances with large
budgets in which the smugglers do not rank the paths in a similar fashion. In
this section, we present a customized branching scheme which addresses this
issue. This branching scheme is based on the following result.
Proposition 31. Consider model (4.10) and let S ⊂ K̄. Then either




rωk ∀ω ∈ Ω. (4.18)
Proof. Suppose xi(k′) + xj(k′) = 0 for some k
′ ∈ S. Then by (4.10c) we have
θω ≥ rωk′ ≥ mink∈S rωk for all ω ∈ Ω.
Proposition 31 states that either we interdict at least one checkpoint
along every path in S, as in (4.17), or every smuggler can freely traverse at
least one path in S, as in (4.18). This suggests a branching scheme in which
we branch on whether (4.17) or (4.18) holds. The advantage to branching in
this fashion is that the lower bounds θω can be tightened in both subproblems
if we intelligently choose the subset S. This is clear for the subproblem in
which (4.18) holds as we can choose θω = mink∈S r
ω
k . For the subproblem in
which (4.17) holds, we must allocate at least one detector to every path in S,
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and so we can compute a tighter θω for any smuggler ω who does not prefer
to traverse any paths in S.





s.t. x ∈ X (4.19b)
θω ≥ rωk − (rωk − θω)+(xi(k) + xj(k)), k ∈ K̄ (4.19c)
θω ≥ θω (4.19d)
xi(k) + xj(k) ≥ 1, k ∈ S. (4.19e)
Problem (4.19) is a single scenario problem of the form (4.8), but with the
added constraint (4.19e). Just as we discuss for (4.8) in Section 4.2.3, it holds
that at an optimal solution (x∗, θω∗) to (4.19), θω∗ can take on at most |K̄|+ 1
distinct values. Therefore given S we can compute θω(S) in polynomial time if
we can determine whether problem (4.19) with the added constraint θω ≤ θ̂ω
is feasible in polynomial time. But (4.19) θω ≤ θ̂ω is feasible if and only if
there exists x ∈ X satisfying
xi(k) + xj(k) ≥ 1, ∀k ∈ {k′ ∈ K̄ : rωk′ > θ̂ω} ∪ S. (4.20)
Condition (4.20) is equivalent to condition (4.9), and so we can determine
feasibility by running Algorithm 2. If (4.17) holds then we can let θω = θω(S)
for every ω ∈ Ω. Of course, we may also add (4.17) to the subproblem as
constraints, which may further tighten the relaxation. Constraints of the form
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(4.17) are similar in spirit to the so-called supervalid inequalities developed by
Israeli and Wood [18] for the deterministic network interdiction problem on
a general network. In that setting the supervalid inequalities were shown to
significantly improve computational efficiency.
We give a high-level description of the branching scheme as follows.
First, branch on the disjunction (4.17) versus (4.18), and, for each subprob-
lem generated, recompute the lower bounds θω, ω ∈ Ω. Then, choose the
subproblem with the minimum
∑
ω∈Ω p
ωθω and branch recursively unless that
subproblem satisfies some termination criteria. For our computational experi-
ments, we set a maximum depth and size of the tree. If a subproblem exceeds
the depth threshold, we do not perform customized branching on that sub-
problem, and if the number of outstanding subproblems in the tree exceeds
a threshold, we terminate customized branching and solve each outstanding
subproblem with a commercial branch-and-bound solver.
When branching on the disjunction (4.17) versus (4.18), the choice of
S is critical in order to guarantee that each subproblem has tighter lower
bounds than its parent. The choice of a larger S tends to strengthen the
bounds for the subproblem associated with (4.17), and a smaller S tends to
strengthen those of the subproblem associated with (4.18). We resolve this
tradeoff in the following way. Let S̄1, . . . , S̄M be the subsets for which (4.17)
is enforced and S1, . . . , SN be the subsets for which (4.18) is enforced at the
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current subproblem. Then as the lower bounds on θω we can choose




rωk ), ω ∈ Ω,
where S̄ = ∪Mm=1S̄m. To assist in determining a subset of paths to branch on,
we define a function of S for each subproblem which estimates the progress
made in that subproblem. For the subproblem in which (4.17) holds we use the
size of S because, as indicated, a larger S tends to strengthen this subproblem.






rωk − θω)+. (4.21)
We can view this function as the sum of increases in the lower bound on θω,





for some t ∈ {1, . . . , |K̄ \ S̄|}. Doing so would guarantee that we cannot
increase V alue(S) without decreasing the size of S. Solving (4.22) exactly is
out of the question since it is at least as hard as BiSNIP, which is known to
be NP-complete. Instead, for each t = 1, . . . , |K̄ \ S̄| we greedily approximate
the solution to (4.22) by computing
V aluet = max
k∈K̄\(St−1∪S̄)
V alue(St−1 ∪ {k}), (4.23)
where S0 = ∅, and letting St = St−1 ∪{k∗}, where k∗ is a maximizer in (4.23).
In order to promote progress in both subproblems, we choose to branch on the
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subset St∗ where
t∗ ∈ argmax1≤t≤|K̄\S̄|t · V aluet.
A pseudo-code representation of the customized branch-and-bound algorithm
can be found in Appendix B.
4.3.4 Computational Results
In this section, we discuss results from two-country model instances
with origins in Russia and destinations in the US. We consider 7 origins in
Russia and 3 destinations in the US, giving a total of |Ω| = 21 threat scenarios.
We assume that the smuggler uses a motor crossing to leave Russia, travels to
either Mexico or Canada via sea or air, and then uses a motor crossing to enter
the US. Figure 4.2a shows the 303 Russian checkpoints and Figure 4.2b shows
the 143 US checkpoints we consider. We assume that detectors are perfectly
reliable and have unit installation costs.
We test four approaches: (1) Solve (4.10) (BASE); (2) Solve (4.15)
(REF); (3) Solve (4.15) eliminating non-binding constraints as described in
Section 4.3.1 (REF-PRUNE); (4) Solve (4.15) via the customized branch-and-
bound scheme described in Section 4.3.3, eliminating non-binding constraints
(REF-PRUNE-C). For each approach, we use wait-and-see bounds to tighten
coefficients and remove constraints. Table 4.1 reports solution times in seconds
for various budget values b. All MIPs were solved with CPLEX 10.1 with a
relative tolerance of 10−4.




Figure 4.2: Motor-crossing checkpoints for a two-country instance
values b = 1, . . . , 100, we solve two one-country problems, one in which we re-
strict ourselves to installing detectors only at Russian checkpoints and another
in which we restrict ourselves to installing detectors only at US checkpoints.
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b BASE REF REF-PRUNE REF-PRUNE-C
10 2 4 1 37
20 37 19 7 54
30 94 44 16 64
40 2340 413 285 152
50 1732 222 87 70
60 × × 5935 170
70 × × × 968
80 × × × 2304
90 × × × 1852
100 × × × 2849
Table 4.1: Solution times in seconds for Russia-US model instances with per-
fectly reliable detectors. × indicates that the solution time exceeded 2 hours.
Figure 4.3 plots the objective value of better of the two one-country solutions
and the objective value of the two-country solution versus the budget. The
objective function values are scaled to one if no detectors are installed, that is,
the y-axis is the ratio of the evasion probability when installing a number of
detectors to that when no detectors are installed. Each one-country problems
solved in a matter of seconds. While the computational effort required to solve
a two-country problem is typically much greater than that of a one-country
problem, for some budget levels we observe two-country solutions with ob-
jective values that are upwards of 2% less than that of the best one-country
solution.
We obtain the largest drops in evasion probability by interdicting check-
points in areas where checkpoints are sparse. For small budgets it is optimal
to interdict checkpoints around the Great Lakes and the checkpoints entering
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Figure 4.3: The improvement factor as a function of the number of detectors
installed for the better of the two one-country solutions and the two-country
solution for the Russia-US model.
California from Mexico, see for example the b = 13 solution in Figure 4.4a. We
see a large drop in evasion probability from b = 46 to b = 51, when we obtain a
large enough budget to interdict all checkpoints in Canada west of Lake Huron
and all checkpoints entering California from Mexico as in the b = 51 solution
in Figure 4.4b. The largest gap between the evasion probability of the best
one-country solution and that of the best two-country solution occurs when
b = 88, for which it is optimal to interdict several checkpoints along the US
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border and to interdict every checkpoint along Russia’s border with Finland
(see Figure 4.5).
(a) b = 13
(b) b = 51
Figure 4.4: Optimal solutions to the Russia-US model instance with perfectly
reliable detectors.
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Figure 4.5: Optimal solution to the Russia-US model for b = 88.
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4.4 Complexity
While most of the problems considered in this dissertation are NP-
complete, some special cases, and variants, can be solved in polynomial time.
For example, BiSNIP is known to be NP-complete, but as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.6 can be solved efficiently if we dualize the budget constraint. Also,
the two-country problem considered in this chapter is NP-complete in the
stochastic setting but as we saw in Section 4.2.3 polynomially solvable in the
deterministic setting. In general, the computational complexity of our class
of network interdiction problems depends strongly on the number of countries
whose borders we may interdict. A natural question, therefore, is whether we
can extend the efficient algorithms that exist for the two special cases men-
tioned here to problems with additional countries. In this section, we answer
this question in the negative. That is, we show that the two-country stochas-
tic network interdiction problem is NP-complete even with a dualized budget
constraint, and the three-country deterministic network interdiction problem
is NP-complete.
4.4.1 Two-Country Stochastic Network Interdiction Problem with
Dualized Budget Constraint





j∈J cjxj ≤ b dualized is NP-complete, even if
ci = cj = 1 for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J , rωk ∈ {0, 1}, and rωk = 0 ∀k ∈ K̄ \ K.
That is to say, we assume detectors have unit costs are perfectly reliable and
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that the probability the smuggler is caught by indigenous law enforcement is
zero. Let Kω+ = {k ∈ K : rωk = 1} denote the set of paths that smuggler ω has













s.t. θω ≥ 1− xi(k) − xj(k), k ∈ Kω+, ω ∈ Ω (4.24b)
θω ≥ 0, ω ∈ Ω (4.24c)
x ∈ {0, 1}|I|+|J |. (4.24d)
The decision problem of (4.24) is to determine if there exists (x, θ) satisfying
(4.24b)-(4.24d) and z ≤ α for some target α. We show that the decision
problem is NP-complete via a reduction from (unweighted) vertex cover. That
is, we show: Given a graph G(V,E) and a positive integer n ≤ |V |, there exists
V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≤ n such that every edge in E is adjacent to at least one
vertex in V ′ if and only if there exists a solution to a transformed instance of
the decision problem of (4.24).
We transform an instance of vertex cover to an instance of the de-
cision problem of (4.24) as follows. For every v ∈ V , create checkpoints
ı̄(v), i(v), ı̄′(v), i′(v) ∈ I and ̄(v), j(v), ̄′(v), j′(v) ∈ J . Create a scenario
ω′ ∈ Ω with pω′ = ε1 and for every v ∈ V let (i(v), ̄(v)), (̄ı(v), j(v)) ∈ Kω
′
+
and for every (v1, v2) ∈ E let (̄ı(v2), ̄(v1)) ∈ Kω
′
+ . For every v ∈ V , cre-
ate scenarios ω̄(v), ω(v) ∈ Ω with pω̄(v) = ε3 and pω(v) = ε3 + ε4 and let




let λ = ε2 and
α = 2|V |ε2 + |V |ε3 + nε4, (4.25)
where ε1, . . . , ε4 > 0 satisfy:
ε1 + 2|V |ε3 + |V |ε4 = 1 (4.26a)
ε1 > 2|V |ε2 + |V |ε3 + nε4 = α (4.26b)
ε2 > |V |ε3 + nε4 (4.26c)
ε3 > nε4. (4.26d)
Equation (4.26a) guarantees that pω, ω ∈ Ω, is a valid probability measure.
The necessity of inequalities (4.26b) - (4.26d) becomes apparent in the fol-
lowing result. The transformed problem is a yes-instance if and only if there

















′ ≥ 1− xi(v) − x̄(v), v ∈ V (4.27b)
θω
′ ≥ 1− xı̄(v) − xj(v), v ∈ V (4.27c)
θω
′ ≥ 1− xı̄(v2) − x̄(v1), (v1, v2) ∈ E (4.27d)
θω̄(v) ≥ 1− xı̄(v) − x̄′(v), v ∈ V (4.27e)
θω̄(v) ≥ 1− xı̄′(v) − x̄(v), v ∈ V (4.27f)
θω(v) ≥ 1− xi(v) − xj′(v), v ∈ V (4.27g)
θω(v) ≥ 1− xi′(v) − xj(v), v ∈ V (4.27h)
x ∈ {0, 1}|I|+|J |. (4.27i)
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Figure 4.6 shows the paths available to each smuggler in the transformed
instance of (4.24) for V = {1, 2, 3} and E = {(1, 2), (2, 3)}.
Figure 4.6: Transformed instance of (4.24) for V = {1, 2, 3} and E =
{(1, 2), (2, 3)}. Each arrow indicates a path that the smuggler has access to
under the given scenario. All available paths have nominal evasion probability
1.
Informally, we connect a solution to (4.27) and a solution to the vertex
cover problem in the following way. The checkpoints ı̄(v) and ̄(v) are inter-
dicted if and only vertex v is included in V ′. Similarly, the checkpoints i(v) and
j(v) are interdicted if and only if vertex v is not included in V ′. In the former
case, smuggler ω̄(v) is always detected and smuggler ω(v) is never detected,
and in the later case the opposite is true. The |V |ε3 term in (4.25) ensures
that we detect either smuggler ω̄(v) or smuggler ω(v) for each v ∈ V , the kε4
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term ensures that at most k of the smugglers ω(v), v ∈ V , evade detection,
and the 2|V |ε2 term ensures that we interdict no more than 2|V | checkpoints.
This guarantees that every vertex is either included or not included in V ′, and
that V ′ includes at most k vertices. Finally, we choose pω
′
= ε1 > α in order
to force detection of smuggler ω′. This forces θω
′
= 0, which guarantees V ′ is
a valid vertex cover by constraint (4.27d). The following result formalizes this
connection.
Lemma 32. Let (x, θ) satisfy (4.27). Then
(a) xı̄′(v) = xi′(v) = x̄′(v) = xj′(v) = 0 for all v ∈ V ;
(b) either xı̄(v) = x̄(v) = 1 and xi(v) = xj(v) = 0 or xı̄(v) = x̄(v) = 0 and
xi(v) = xj(v) = 1 for all v ∈ V ;
(c) if V ′ ⊆ V indexes all v satisfying xı̄(v) = x̄(v) = 1, then |V ′| ≤ n;
(d) for every (v1, v2) ∈ E, either xı̄(v1) = x̄(v1) = 1 or xı̄(v2) = x̄(v2) = 1.
Proof. We first show that we must have
xi(v) + x̄(v) ≥ 1 ∀v ∈ V (4.28a)
xı̄(v) + xj(v) ≥ 1 ∀v ∈ V. (4.28b)
If not, then θω
′ ≥ 1 by (4.27b) - (4.27c) and z ≥ ε1 > α by (4.26b). Summing
the inequalities in (4.28) gives us
∑
v∈V
(xı̄(v) + xi(v) + x̄(v) + xj(v)) ≥ 2|V |, (4.29)
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which, coupled with the fact that ∪v∈V {i(v), ı̄(v)} ⊂ I and ∪v∈V {j(v), ̄(v)} ⊂





xj ≥ 2|V |. (4.30)
If inequality (4.30) is strict, then we have z ≥ (2|V |+ 1)ε2 > 2|V |ε2 + |V |ε3 +





xj = 2|V |. (4.31)
Inequality (4.29) implies that if any of xı̄′(v), xi′(v), x̄′(v), xj′(v) were equal to 1
then (4.31) would be violated. Therefore part (a) holds.
To prove part (b), we show that for all v ∈ V , exactly one of θω̄(v) and
θω(v) equals 0. From (4.28) we have that xı̄(v) +xi(v) +x̄(v) +xj(v) ≥ 2 ∀v ∈ V .
If this inequality were strict for some v ∈ V , then (4.31) would be violated.
Therefore
xı̄(v) + xi(v) + x̄(v) + xj(v) = 2 ∀v ∈ V. (4.32)
Suppose that for some v ∈ V both θω̄(v) < 1 and θω(v) < 1. Inequalities (4.27e)
- (4.27f), coupled with the fact that xı̄′(v) = x̄′(v) = 0, imply xı̄(v) = x̄(v) = 1,
and inequalities (4.27g) - (4.27h), coupled with the fact that xi′(v) = xj′(v) =
0, imply xi(v) = xj(v) = 1. This contradicts (4.32) so we must have either
θω̄(v) ≥ 1 or θω(v) ≥ 1 for all v ∈ V . But we cannot have both θω̄(v) ≥ 1 and
θω(v) ≥ 1 for any v ∈ V , since this implies z ≥ 2|V |ε2 + (|V | + 1)ε3 + ε4 >
2|V |ε2 + |V |ε3 + (n + 1)ε4 > α by (4.26d). So either θω̄(v) = 0 which forces
xı̄(v) = x̄(v) = 1 and xi(v) = xj(v) = 0, or θ
ω(v) = 0 which forces xı̄(v) = x̄(v) = 0
and xi(v) = xj(v) = 1. This proves part (b).
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To prove part (c), note that part (b) implies that θω̄(v) ≥ 1 for all
v ∈ V \V̄ and θω(v) ≥ 1 for all v ∈ V ′. Therefore, z ≥ 2|V |ε2+|V |ε3+|V ′|ε4 > α
unless |V ′| ≤ k. Finally, we have already shown that we cannot have θω′ ≥ 1,
so by (4.27d) we must have either xı̄(v1) = 1 or x̄(v2) = 1. By part (b), this
implies that either xı̄(v1) = x̄(v1) = 1 or xı̄(v2) = x̄(v2) = 1, which proves part
(d).
Theorem 33. The decision version of (4.24) is NP-complete.
Proof. We first establish that the decision version of (4.24) belongs to the
class NP. Note that a polynomial-length guess consists of a subset S ⊆ I ∪ J
of interdicted checkpoints. We can determine in polynomial time whether or
not such a guess verifies an instance of the decision version of (4.24) as a yes-
instance provided that we can efficiently evaluate the evasion probability for
each smuggler given that every checkpoint in subset S is interdicted. Comput-
ing the evasion probability for a particular smuggler can be done in polynomial
time by a complete enumeration of all paths.
We must show that the original vertex cover instance is a yes-instance
if and only if the transformed instance of the decision problem of (4.24) is
a yes-instance. Suppose the vertex cover instance is a yes-instance. Then
there exists V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≤ n such that for every (v1, v2) ∈ E, either
v1 ∈ V ′ or v2 ∈ V ′. Given V ′, we construct a solution to (4.27) as follows.
For every v ∈ V , let xı̄′(v) = xi′(v) = x̄′(v) = xj′(v) = 0. For every v ∈ V ′, let
xı̄(v) = x̄(v) = 1 and xi(v) = xj(v) = 0, and let θ
ω̄(v) = 0 and θω(v) = 1. For
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every v ∈ V \V ′, let xı̄(v) = x̄(v) = 0 and xi(v) = xj(v) = 1, and let θω̄(v) = 1 and
θω(v) = 0. Finally, since for every (v1, v2) ∈ E either xı̄(v2) = 1 or x̄(v2) = 1,
we can let θω
′
= 0. Since |V ′| ≤ n, we have z ≤ 2|V |ε2 + |V |ε3 + kε4 = α, and
thus the instance of the decision problem of (4.24) is a yes-instance.
To show the reverse direction, suppose the transformed instance of the
decision problem of (4.24) is a yes-instance. Then there exists (x, θ) satisfying
(4.27). We know by Lemma 32(b) that either xı̄(v) = x̄(v) = 1 and xi(v) =
xj(v) = 0 or vice-versa. Let V
′ = {v ∈ V : xı̄(v) = x̄(v) = 1}. By Lemma 32(c)
we know that |V ′| ≤ k, and by Lemma 32(d) we know that for every (v1, v2) ∈
E, either v1 ∈ V ′ or v2 ∈ V ′. So V ′ is a valid vertex cover and thus the vertex
cover instance is a yes-instance.
4.4.2 Three-Country Deterministic Network Interdiction Problem
For some stochastic network interdiction problems, the bounds pro-
vided by the solution to the wait-and-see problem can be used to improve
computational performance. Since these bounds are computed by solving a
single-scenario problem for each smuggler scenario, the effectiveness of such
a strategy is linked to our ability to efficiently solve the deterministic version
of the interdiction problem. In the deterministic setting, we can solve the
one-country problem via a greedy algorithm and the two-country problem via
a minimum cut problem. In this section, we prove that it is NP-complete
to solve the three-country deterministic interdiction problem, even with unit
interdiction costs and perfectly reliable detectors.
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We describe the three-country deterministic interdiction problem as
follows. Let h ∈ H, i ∈ I, and j ∈ J index sets of checkpoint arcs in a
transportation network G(N,A). First, an interdictor chooses b checkpoint
arcs to remove from the network. Then, a smuggler with a given origin o ∈ N
and destination d ∈ N chooses a o-d path which maximizes the probability
that he avoids detection. Without being detected, the smuggler can traverse a
path from the origin o to the tail of a checkpoint arc h ∈ H with probability pho ,
from the head of checkpoint arc h ∈ H to the tail of checkpoint arc i ∈ I with
probability pih, from the head of checkpoint arc i ∈ I to the tail of checkpoint
arc j ∈ J with probability pji , and from the head of checkpoint arc j ∈ J to the
destination d with probability pdj . The smuggler may traverse a checkpoint arc
without being detected with probability 1 unless the interdictor removes the
arc. A checkpoint arc becomes impassible when removed. Let K = H ∪ I ∪ J ,
and let decision variable xk = 1 if checkpoint arc k ∈ K is interdicted and
xk = 0 otherwise. We define a subset of checkpoints K0 ⊂ K, which indexes all
checkpoints which cannot receive detectors, i.e., xk = 0, k ∈ K0. Note that we
can form an equivalent model in which every checkpoint can receive a detector
by creating a total of b + 1 copies of every checkpoint in K0. We modify a
dynamic programming based LP formulation of the maximum reliability path
problem in which πk, k ∈ K, is the probability that the smuggler can traverse
path from the tail of checkpoint arc k ∈ K to the destination d without being
detected, and πo is the probability that the smuggler can traverse an o-d path
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s.t. x ∈ X (4.33b)
πj = (p
t
j − xj)+, j ∈ J (4.33c)
πi = (max
j∈J
pjiπj − xi)+, i ∈ I (4.33d)
πh = (max
i∈I




where X = {x ∈ B|K| :
∑
k∈K xk ≤ b, xk = 0, k ∈ K0}.
The decision problem of (4.33) is to determine if there exists (x, π)
satisfying (4.33b)-(4.33f) and πs ≤ α for some target α. We show that the
decision problem is NP-complete via reduction from (unweighted) vertex cover.
In the undirected graph G(V,E) associated with the vertex cover instance, we
represent every edge e ∈ E as e = (v1(e), v2(e)) where v1(e) and v2(e) are
ordered arbitrarily. We also define El(v) = {e ∈ E : vl(e) = v} for l = 1, 2
and v ∈ V . We transform an instance of vertex cover into an instance of the
decision problem of (4.33) as follows. For every v ∈ V , create checkpoints
h(v) ∈ H and i0(v) ∈ I ∩ K0. For every e ∈ E, create checkpoints i(e) ∈ I
and j(e) ∈ J . Finally, create checkpoints h0 ∈ H ∩K0 and j0 ∈ J ∩K0, and
choose α = ε2, where 0 < ε < 1, and b = n + |E|. The transformed instance
of the decision problem of (4.33) is a yes-instance if and only if there exists
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(x, π) satisfying:
x ∈ X (4.34a)
πo ≤ ε2 (4.34b)
πj(e) = 1− xj(e), e ∈ E (4.34c)









, e ∈ E (4.34e)
πi0(v) = max
e∈E2(v)






















We connect a solution to the vertex cover instance and a solution to
(4.34) in the following way. If (4.34) is feasible, then there exists a solution
(x, π) with
∑
v∈V xh(v) ≤ n in which the set V ′ = {v ∈ V : xh(v) = 1} is a valid
vertex cover. And, given a vertex cover V ′, there exists a solution (x, π) to
(4.34) with xh(v) = 1 if and only if v ∈ V ′, xi(e) = 1 if v1(e) 6∈ V ′, and xj(e) = 1
if v2(e) 6∈ V ′. Since either v1(e) ∈ V ′ or v2(e) ∈ V ′ for any feasible vertex
cover V ′, we have that exactly n + |E| checkpoints are interdicted. If v1(e)
and v2(e) are both in V
′, we arbitrarily choose one of xi(e) and xj(e) to equal
1. Figure 4.7 shows the network corresponding to (4.34) for V = {1, 2, 3} and
E = {e1, e2} where e1 = (1, 2) and e2 = (2, 3). For n = 2, there exists a vertex
cover V ′ = {1, 2}. The corresponding solution to the interdiction problem is
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to interdict checkpoints h(1), h(2), j(e2) and either i(e1) or j(e1). The only
remaining paths in the residual network go through checkpoints h0 and j0 and
have reliability ε2.
Figure 4.7: Network corresponding to (4.34) for V = {1, 2, 3} and E = {e1, e2}
where e1 = (1, 2) and e2 = (2, 3). Solid arrows indicate arcs with reliability 1,
while dotted arrows indicate arcs with reliability ε.
We formalize this connection in the following results.
Lemma 34. If system (4.34) is feasible, then there exists (x, π) satisfying both
(4.34) and:
xi(e) + xj(e) = 1, e ∈ E (4.35a)∑
v∈V xh(v) ≤ n. (4.35b)
Proof. Suppose (x, π) satisfies (4.34). By (4.34b) and (4.34i) we must have
πh0 ≤ ε2, which is true only if πi(e) ≤ ε for all e ∈ E, which in turn is
true only if xi(e) + xj(e) ≥ 1 for all e ∈ E by (4.34c) and (4.34e). Let E ′ =
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{e ∈ E : xi(e) + xj(e) = 2}. Then we can perturb (x, π) in the following
way and maintain feasibility of (4.34). For every e ∈ E ′, let xj(e) = 0 and
xh(v2(e)) = 1. This can only decrease
∑
k∈K xk and so we maintain x ∈ X. For
every e ∈ E ′ set πj(e) = 1 to maintain feasibility of (4.34c), and set πi0(v2(e)) = ε
to maintain feasibility of (4.34f). Note that we still have xi(e) = 1 for all
e ∈ E ′, so constraint (4.34e) is unaffected by the perturbation. Similarly
(4.34g) is unaffected even when v = v2(e) since we set xh(v2(e)) = 1. The
perturbed solution is feasible to (4.34) and satisfies (4.35a). Condition (4.35a)
implies
∑
e∈E xi(e) + xj(e) = |E|, and therefore condition (4.35b) also holds
since
∑
k∈K xk ≤ n+ |E|.
Theorem 35. The decision version of (4.33) is NP-complete.
Proof. We first establish that the decision version of (4.33) belongs to the class
NP. A polynomial-length guess consists of S ⊆ H ∪ I ∪ J with |S| = b. Given
that all checkpoints in subset S are interdicted, we can compute the smuggler’s
evasion probability in polynomial time by a complete enumeration of all paths.
We can then verify whether or not S verifies an instance of the decision version
of (4.33) as a yes-instance by comparing the evasion probability to α.
We show that (4.34) is feasible if and only if there exists a vertex cover
of size n or less. Let V ′ ⊆ V be a vertex cover with |V ′| ≤ n. Then we
construct a solution to (4.34) as follows. Let xh(v) = 1 if v ∈ V ′ and let
xh(v) = 0 otherwise. For every e ∈ E, if v1(e) /∈ V ′ let xi(e) = 1 and xj(e) = 0,
and let xi(e) = 0 and xj(e) = 1 otherwise. Note that since V
′ is a vertex cover,
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for every e ∈ E either v1(e) or v2(e) is in V ′, and so xj(e) = 1 if v2(e) /∈ V ′. We
have
∑
k∈K xk = n + |E| and so x ∈ X. Since xi(e) + xj(e) = 1 for all e ∈ E,
we can set πi(e) = ε(1 − xi(e)) and therefore πh0 = ε2 maxe∈E(1 − xi(e)) ≤ ε2.
So πo ≤ ε2 if πh(v) ≤ ε2. But πh(v) > ε2 implies that xh(v) = 0 and that
either xi(e) = 0 for some e ∈ E1(v) or xj(e) for some e ∈ E2(v). This leads
to a contradiction, since xh(v) = 0 implies that v /∈ V ′, and thus xi(e) = 1 if
v1(e) /∈ V ′ and xj(e) = 1 if v2(e) /∈ V ′.
Next, we show that if there exists a solution to (4.34), then the vertex
cover instance is a yes-instance. By Lemma 34, if (4.34) is feasible, then there
exists a solution satisfying (4.35a) and (4.35b). Let (x, π) be such a solution.
Then for every v ∈ V , either xh(v) = 1 or πi(e) ≤ ε2 for all e ∈ E1(v) by (4.34b)
and (4.34g). But πi(e) ≤ ε2 only if xi(e) = 1, so
xh(v1(e)) + xi(e) ≥ 1, e ∈ E. (4.36)
Similarly, for every v ∈ V , either xh(v) = 1 or πi0(v) ≤ ε2. But πi0(v) ≤ ε2 only
if xj(e) = 1 for all e ∈ E2(v) and so,
xh(v2(e)) + xj(e) ≥ 1, e ∈ E. (4.37)
Since for every e ∈ E, either xi(e) or xj(e) equals 0 by (4.35a), we have that
either xh(v1(e)) or xh(v2(e)) equals 1. So V
′ = {v ∈ V : xh(v) = 1} is a valid
vertex cover, and |V ′| ≤ n by (4.35b).
Table 4.2 gives a summary of the complexity results of the Stackelberg
games considered in this dissertation. All problems in P remain polynomially-
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solvable even with arbitrary interdiction costs, and all NP-complete problems
remain hard even with unit interdiction costs.
Number of Countries
1 2 3
Deterministic P P NP-complete
Stochastic with Soft Budget P NP-complete NP-complete
Stochastic with Hard Budget NP-complete NP-complete NP-complete





This dissertation has developed models and solution techniques for a
class of stochastic network interdiction problems. In these models, an inter-
dictor installs detectors on arcs in a network subject to a budget constraint,
while a smuggler selects a path in the residual network. The interdictor’s goal
is to minimize the reliability of the smuggler’s chosen path. Relevant smuggler
characteristics such as the origin-destination pair, mass and type of mate-
rial being smuggled, and the thickness of shielding are known only through a
probability distribution at the time the detectors are installed. The models
considered vary in the number of countries in which the interdictor can in-
stall detectors and whether the two parties act simultaneously or sequentially.
The work in this dissertation was motivated by the Second Line of Defense
(SLD) Program, which is a cooperative program between the US DOE and
the Russian Federation State Customs Committee. The SLD Program aims
to minimize the risk of illicit trafficking of nuclear material, equipment and
technology.
Chapter 2 considers a Stackelberg game in which the interdictor can
only install detectors at border checkpoints of a single country. The single
163
country in question will typically be either a country from which we expect
material may be stolen, such as Russia, or a country that we wish to keep
smugglers from entering, such as the United States. We present conditions
under which smuggler scenarios with similar attributes may be aggregated.
While the problem is NP-complete with a hard budget constraint, the problem
becomes solvable in polynomial time when the budget constraint is dualized.
This implies that solutions on the concave envelope of the efficient frontier can
be found in polynomial time. We use the fact that the decrease in the smug-
gler’s evasion probability as a function of the set of interdicted checkpoints
is supermodular to show that solutions on the concave envelope are nested.
A naive mixed-integer programming (MIP) formulation of the problem can
lead to loose linear-programming (LP) relaxations. We present an extended
formulation based on a polyhedral analysis which tightens the LP relaxation
and develop an associated branch-and-bound algorithm which utilizes easily
computed wait-and-see bounds and performs well on particularly challenging
instances.
Chapter 3 considers a two-person zero-sum Cournot game in which
the interdictor and the smuggler act simultaneously. The challenge here lies
in the fact that the interdictor must place a probability distribution over an
exponentially-sized set of pure strategies. We show that in the single-country
case if the detectors have unit installation costs, we may determine the value of
the game by solving a polynomially-sized LP in which the decision variables are
the marginal probabilities that a checkpoint receives a detector. We present an
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easily-implementable version of the weighted majority algorithm to find a joint
distribution which approximates the marginals. Finally, we present a model
in which the interdictor can install two types of assets; the first type is visible
to the smuggler and the second is not. This model may be appropriate if, for
example, the interdictor can “upgrade” some subset of the installed detectors
or if the interdictor can install “decoy” detectors.
Chapter 4 extends the results for the Stackelberg game considered in
Chapter 2 to the case in which the interdictor can install detectors at border
checkpoints of both the origin and destination country. If the smuggler char-
acteristics are known before the detectors are installed, the problem can be
solved in polynomial time by solving a sequence of vertex cover problems on
bipartite graphs. Thus, the wait-and-see bounds for the stochastic problem
are easily obtained. We use these bounds to tighten the LP relaxation of the
associated MIP formulation. We conclude with complexity results for the two-
country problem with a dualized budget constraint and for the three-country
problem. These results fill out the complexity landscape for the Stackelberg
version of the problem.
The main contributions of this dissertation lie in both the development
of a Cournot model and associated solution techniques for the maximum-
reliability stochastic network interdiction problem, and significant algorithmic
advances for the Stackelberg model. In particular, the customized branch-
and-bound scheme developed for the one- and two-country models allows us
to solve significantly larger problem instances than was possible using previ-
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ous methods. We also make several connections between network interdiction
models and other research areas, i.e., the selection problem, supermodularity,





Customized Branch-and-Bound for BiSNIP
The following is a pseudo-code representation of the customized branch-
and-bound algorithm for solving BiSNIP. For a subproblem P in the branch-
and-bound tree, we define S̄(P ) = {S̄1, . . . , S̄m} as the set of subsets S̄i ⊂
K, i = 1, . . . ,m, for which xk = 1, k ∈ ∪mi=1S̄i is enforced, and S(P ) =




|Si| − 1, i = 1, . . . , n is enforced. We use a standard last-in, first-out stack to
store the subproblems in the tree.
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Algorithm 3: GetF ixedV ariables(P )
Input: Problem P
Output: Set U of all (k, ω) pairs corresponding to uωk which should be fixed
to 0 in problem P
Let S̄ be the union of the elements of S̄(P )
Let S1, . . . , Sn be the elements of S(P )
U ← ∅
for all ω ∈ Ω, k ∈ K do
for i = 1, . . . , n do
if Si ⊆ Kωk then






ck′ > b then





Input: Partial solution û to the LP relaxation of a BiSNIP instance
Output: Subset of checkpoints to branch on S
S0 ← ∅
for t = 1, . . . , b do
Compute St ∈ argmaxk∈K\St−1Loss(St−1 ∪ {k})
Losst ← Loss(St)
end for




Algorithm 5: BranchAndBound(p, r, c, b)
Input: Scenario probabilities pω > 0, evasion probabilities rωk ≥ 0, detector
installation costs ck ≥ 1, installation budget b
Output: Optimal installation plan x∗, minimum evasion probability z∗
for all ω ∈ Ω do
Sort the components of rωk in decreasing order
for i = 1, . . . , |K| do
Let k(i, ω) ∈ K denote the ith checkpoint in the sorted list
Let Kωk(i,ω) = {k(i′, ω) : 1 ≤ i′ ≤ i}
Compute sωk(i,ω) = r
ω
k(i,ω) − rωk(i+1,ω) where rωk(|K|+1,ω) ≡ 0
end for
end for
Create problem P with S̄(P ) = S(P ) = ∅
Create an empty stack of problems and push P onto the stack
LB ← −∞
while stack not empty do
Pop problem P off the stack
U ← GetF ixedV ariables(P )
Let (x̂, û) be the optimal solution to the LP relaxation of (2.29) with the









if ẑ > LB then





Create problems P̄ ← P and P ← P
Add S to S̄(P̄ ) and to S(P )
Push P onto stack











Customized Branch-and-Bound for the
Two-Country Stochastic Network Interdiction
Problem
The following is a pseudo-code representation of the customized branch-
and-bound algorithm for solving the two-country stochastic network interdic-
tion problem. For a subproblem P in the branch-and-bound tree, we define
S̄(P ) = {S̄1, . . . , S̄m} as the set of subsets S̄i ⊂ K̄, i = 1, . . . ,m, for which
xi(k) + xj(k) ≥ 1, k ∈ ∪mi=1S̄i is enforced, and S(P ) = {S1, . . . , Sn} as the set
of subsets Si ⊂ K̄, i = 1, . . . , n, for which θω ≥ max1≤i≤n mink∈Si r
ω
k , ω ∈ Ω, is
enforced. We use a pair of priority queues, pq1 and pq2, to store subproblems
in the tree. The former stores those subproblems which are still eligible for
customized branching, and the latter stores those which are to be solved by a
commercial branch-and-bound solver. For each priority queue, a pop operation
returns the subproblem in the queue with the smallest lower bound.
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Algorithm 6: GetCriticalSubset(P )
Input: Problem P
Output: Subset of paths to branch on S
Let S̄ be the union of the elements of S̄(P )
S0 ← ∅
for t = 1, . . . , |K̄ \ S̄| do
Compute St ∈ argmaxk∈K̄\(St−1∪S̄)V alue(St−1 ∪ {k})
V aluet ← V alue(St)
end for
Let t∗ ∈ argmax1≤t≤|K̄\S̄|t · V aluet
S ← St∗
return S
Algorithm 7: UpdateBoundsAndPush(pq, P, UB)
Input: Priority queue pq, problem P , objective function upper bound UB
Output: Updated θ(P, ω), ω ∈ Ω, problem P pushed onto pq if lower bound
for P less than UB
Let S̄ be the union of the elements of S̄(P )
Let S1, . . . , SN be the elements of S(P )
LB ← 0
for all ω ∈ Ω do
θ(P, ω)← max(θω(S̄),max1≤n≤N mink∈Sn r
ω
k )
LB ← LB + θ(P, ω)
end for
if LB < UB then
Push P onto pq with priority LB
end if
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Algorithm 8: BranchAndBound(p, r, c, b, UB,MAXD,MAXP )
Input: Scenario probabilities pω > 0, evasion probabilities rωk ≥ 0, inter-
diction costs ci, cj, installation budget b, objective function upper bound
UB, maximum depth of branch-and-bound tree MAXD, maximum size of
branch-and-bound tree MAXP
Output: Optimal interdiction plan x∗, minimum evasion probability z∗
Create two empty priority queues of problems pq1 and pq2
Create problem P with S̄(P ) = S(P ) = ∅ and θ(P, ω) = θω(∅), ω ∈ Ω




while pq1 not empty and pq1.size+ pq2.size < MAXP do
Pop problem P off of pq1
if |S̄(P )|+ |S(P )| ≥MAXD then






S ← GetCriticalSubset(P )
Create P̄ ← P and P ← P
Add St∗ to S̄(P̄ ) and to S(P )
UpdateBoundsAndPush(pq1, P̄ , UB)
UpdateBoundsAndPush(pq1, P , UB)
end while
while pq1 not empty do
Pop problem P off of pq1





while pq2 not empty do
Pop problem P off of pq2
Let S̄ be the union of the elements of S̄(P )
Let x̂, θ̂ be the optimal solution to (4.10) with θω = θ(P, ω) and with the
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